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Shopping During Extended Store 
Hours: From No Shops to Go-Shops 
THE DEVELOPMENT, EFFECTIVENESS, AND 
IMPLICATIONS OF GO-SHOP PROVISIONS IN 
CHANGE OF CONTROL TRANSACTIONS 
Christina M. Sautter† 
BUD FOX: How much is enough? 
GORDON GEKKO: It’s not a question of enough, pal. It’s a zero-sum 
game, somebody wins and somebody loses. 
—Wall Street1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The question “How much is enough?” has likely 
resonated through boardrooms for decades in the wake of the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s 1986 landmark decision, Revlon, 
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,2 announcing that 
once the sale of a company becomes inevitable, the board must 
take steps to ensure the maximization of value for the benefit 
of the stockholders.3 The Supreme Court forever altered the 
corporate sales process by further stating that directors should 
foster competitive bidding to obtain the highest price possible 
  
 † Westerfield Fellow, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law; J.D., 
summa cum laude & Order of the Coif, Villanova University School of Law, 2002; B.S., 
summa cum laude, Florida State University, 1999. Many thanks to Professors Trey 
Drury and Robert Miller for their comments and suggestions. Thank you also to Dr. 
Heiko Schiwek and Jay Mirostaw for their comments and insights. In addition, I would 
like to extend my gratitude to my colleagues, Kim D. Chanbonpin, for her comments 
and support, and Vik Kanwar for his suggestions. Thank you also to the Villanova 
University School of Law Faculty for allowing me to present this Article as a work-in-
progress during their Faculty Workshop Series. Finally, thank you to Tim Kappel for 
his research assistance. Naturally, the views and, particularly, the errors contained 
herein are solely my own. 
 1 WALL STREET (Amercent Films, American Entertainment Partners L.P., 
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 1987).  
 2 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).  
 3 Id. at 182. 
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for stockholders.4 Initially, this appeared to signal a movement 
toward a purer auction model, or at least a more competitive 
bidding process in the market for corporate control.5 Over the 
past twenty years, however, dealmakers have devised various 
tactics and sale methods in response to this perceived 
movement.6  
Similar to Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence, corporate 
sale methods are not formed in a vacuum, but are products of 
the periods in which they are developed. Revlon, for example, is 
a direct result of the mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) 
landscape of the 1980s, which for many is best exemplified by 
the 1987 movie Wall Street. This period was marked by 
unprecedented deal volume, highly leveraged transactions, 
hostile takeovers, and corporate raiders, like Gordon Gekko, 
who often challenged entrenched management.7 The buyout 
boom of the 1980s left a lasting impression on corporate case 
law, as the Delaware courts issued a number of watershed 
opinions addressing a board’s obligations to stockholders as 
well as management and board greed. The cases stemmed from 
stockholder allegations that boards and management resisted 
deals offering large premiums in an effort to maintain their 
jobs.8 
  
 4 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183.  
 5 See Mark J. Loewenstein, Toward an Auction Market for Corporate Control 
and the Demise of the Business Judgment Rule, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 66-68 (1989) 
(describing the movement toward an auction model for corporate control).  
 6 The focus of this Article is on post-signing market checks and go-shop 
provisions. For in-depth discussions of these sale methods, see infra Part II.C-E. 
 7 See Jason M. Klein, When the Board Should Just Say Yes to Management: 
The Interplay Between the Decision of Whether to Conduct an Auction and Transaction 
Structure, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN., Aug. 1999, at 45, 45-46 (describing the M&A 
environment in the 1980s); Joseph S. Allerhand & Bradley R. Aronstam, New Wave of 
M&A Litigation Attacks Private Equity Deals, 238 N.Y.L.J. 9 (July 9, 2007) (“[M]erger 
and acquisition activity in the 1980s was epitomized by hostile takeovers and the 
‘omnipresent specter’ of entrenched management . . . .”). During the early 1980s, 
management buyouts (“MBOs”) were characterized by the sales of divisions of larger 
companies, but the trend shifted in the mid-1980s to highly leveraged MBOs of 
complete companies rather than divisions. Klein, supra, at 45-46. The trend shifted 
again during the late 1980s when management utilized MBOs as defensive tactics 
against corporate raiders. Id. at 46; see also Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How 
Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1022 (1997) (stating that 
management obtained job security through MBOs).  
 8 See Peter Lattman & Dana Cimilluca, Court Faults Buyouts—Delaware 
Rulings Raise Disclosure Questions in Topps, Lear Deals, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2007, at 
C1 (describing the legal claims arising from the 1980s buyout boom and recognizing 
corporate raiders offered stockholders large premiums and promised to remove boards 
and management).  
2008] FROM NO SHOPS TO GO-SHOPS 527 
The furious dealmaking activity of the last few years 
has led some to compare the current M&A environment to that 
of the 1980s.9 In many respects, the comparison is a fair one as 
there has been a resurgence of leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”),10 
management buyouts (“MBOs”),11 and hostile takeovers.12 There 
are, however, a number of subtle but important developments 
that highlight the differences between the two decades. Unlike 
the hostile transactions of the 1980s that were generally led by 
corporate raiders, today’s hostile takeover attempts are 
increasingly launched by strategic buyers and, more recently, 
private equity buyers.13 In addition, corporate raiders have 
been replaced by, or have simply transformed themselves into, 
stockholder activists.14 For example, Carl Icahn, the 
quintessential corporate raider—and real-life Gordon Gekko 
  
 9 See Rik Kirkland, Private Money, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2007, at 50 (comparing 
the current prevalence of private equity leveraged buyouts to leveraged buyouts  in the 
1980s); Joe Nocera, From Raider to Activist, But Still Icahn, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, 
at C1 (quoting Peter J. Solomon, a prominent New York investment banker, as stating, 
“We are in a carnivorous wave . . . . The last one was about greenmailing and corporate 
raiding. This one is about private equity and activists.”).  
 10 An LBO is a takeover of a company in which an acquirer uses borrowed 
funds to finance the transaction. Typically, the target company’s assets are used as 
security for the debt the acquirer incurred in purchasing the target. In an LBO, the 
acquirer profits by taking the company public with an initial public offering, or by 
selling the company to another acquirer.  
 11 An MBO is a transaction in which the target company’s management 
purchases the target’s publicly held shares and takes the company private. An MBO is 
typically financed as a leveraged buyout.  
 12 See Philip Mills & Mutya Harsch, Hostile Takeovers: How to Avoid the 
Jump, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 2006, at 44, 44-45 (describing increases in financial 
sponsored deals and hostile activity globally).  
 13 See Igor Kirman, Takeover Law and Practice, in DOING DEALS 2007: 
UNDERSTANDING THE NUTS & BOLTS OF TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE 9, 22 (PLI Corp. 
Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 1594, 2007) (contrasting today’s hostile activity 
involving strategic buyers to hostile deals in the 1970s and 1980s); see also In re 
Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 198 (Del. Ch. 2007) (recognizing 
that, in the early part of this decade, strategic buyers jumped competitors’ deals  
and that the current trend is for private equity firms to outbid strategic buyers); In re 
Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1008 (Del. Ch. 2005) (recognizing  
that a marketplace exists “where strategic buyers have not felt shy about ‘jumping’ 
friendly deals crafted between their industry rivals”); ROBERT E. SPATT, THE FOUR 
RING CIRCUS—ROUND ELEVEN; A FURTHER UPDATED VIEW OF THE MATING DANCE 
AMONG ANNOUNCED MERGER PARTNERS AND AN UNSOLICITED SECOND OR THIRD 
BIDDER 1, 1-9 (Mar. 17, 2007), available at http://stblaw.com/content/publications/ 
publications23_0.pdf (listing examples of U.S. and foreign transactions from 1994 to 
early 2007 in which a deal was jumped or a jump was attempted). 
 14 See Kirman, supra note 13, at 27-28 (discussing increase in stockholder 
activism).  
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figure of the 1980s—has now embraced the role of stockholder 
activist.15  
Recent years have seen the unprecedented growth of 
M&A activity and the re-emergence of private equity firms 
playing an enhanced role in M&A deals. For example, in 2006, 
global deal volume totaled $3.79 trillion with private equity 
buyouts accounting for nearly a fifth of all deals.16 Dealmakers 
began 2007 at an even more accelerated pace. During the first 
half of the year, deal volume totaled $1.005 trillion in the 
United States alone, representing a 36% increase from the 
same period in 2006 and marking the first time that M&A 
activity has ever reached that level in the first half of any 
year.17 During the first half of 2007, private equity firm-
sponsored LBOs accounted for $644 billion worth of deals 
worldwide.18 This is up 95.1% from 2006 and accounts for 34% 
of the $1.005 trillion of U.S. deal activity and nearly a quarter 
of all merger activity worldwide.19 Although recent months 
have seen turmoil in the credit markets that are so vital to 
private equity transactions and dealmaking generally, record 
transaction volume demonstrates that we have been in the 
midst of a distinctive time for deal activity over the past few 
years.  
Like the unique takeover activity of the 1980s, the 
recent M&A boom has prompted the Delaware courts to 
address the actions, and sometimes the alleged greed, of 
  
 15 See Nocera, supra note 9, at C1 (describing Icahn’s transition from 
corporate raider to stockholder activist); see also William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds  
and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1377-79 (2007) (describing recent  
example of Icahn’s stockholder activism during proposed Mylan Laboratories-King 
Pharmaceuticals deal).  
 16 Heather Timmons, The Year That Made Deal Makers Giddy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 5, 2007, at C6 (citing Thomson Financial statistics regarding 2006 deal flow and 
indicating that another statistics firm, Dealogic, has stated that 2006 deal flow was 
worth even more, at $3.98 trillion). According to Thomson Financial, the $3.79 trillion 
figure represents an increase of 38% from 2005. Id.  
 17 See Jessica Hall, U.S. Merger Volume Hits Record Despite Soft  
June, REUTERS, June 28, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/mergersNews/idUSN 
2837929220070628 (citing Dealogic statistics).  
 18 Grace Wong, Private Equity: Scrooge No Longer, CNNMONEY.COM,  
July 10, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/07/10/markets/pe_philanthropy/index.htm 
(citing Thomson Financial statistics).  
 19 Id. (citing Thomson Financial statistics that the number of private equity 
deals accounted for a quarter of all M&A deals worldwide and represented a 95.1% 
increase from the previous year); Grace Wong, Private Equity: The Beat Goes On, 
CNNMONEY.COM, July 4, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/07/04/markets/pe_what_ 
next/index.htm (citing Dealogic statistics that private equity buyouts accounted for 
34% of $1 trillion U.S. deal activity in the first six months of 2007). 
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corporate management and boards.20 This time the cases often 
involve allegations by stockholders that boards have favored 
private equity buyers who are seeking to retain management 
with enhanced compensation packages.21 Like the 1980s, 
today’s high deal volume and new dealmakers are creating a 
new set of issues for courts to address, including new sale 
methods that purportedly enable boards to better satisfy their 
Revlon duties.22  
Perhaps the most prominent and controversial among 
these new deal tactics are go-shop provisions. Unlike “no shop” 
or “window shop” provisions—deal protection devices which 
prevent a target company from actively soliciting bids following 
the signing of a definitive agreement—go-shop provisions 
permit a target company to actively solicit alternative bidders 
for a limited period after entering into a definitive agreement 
with an acquirer.23 Since Revlon, dealmakers have relied 
primarily on pre-signing public auctions or targeted market 
canvasses in an effort to obtain the highest possible price for 
stockholders.24 Because these sale methods are completed pre-
signing, M&A agreements generally include a “fiduciary out”25 
that enables the target board to consider unsolicited third 
party offers received between signing and receipt of stockholder 
approval. However, the board may only consider the third 
  
 20 This Article focuses solely on Delaware law because of Delaware’s well-
developed body of corporate case law, its continuing influence over other states’ 
corporate laws, and its dominant position in the incorporation market. For example, 
over 50% of U.S. corporations that are currently traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ, and 61% of Fortune 500 companies, are incorporated in 
Delaware. DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, DEL. DEP’T OF STATE, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, 
http://www.corp.delaware.gov (search for “2006 Annual Report”). 
 21 See Lattman & Cimilluca, supra note 8, at C1 (“In the current buyout 
craze, many buyout firms retain the management by offering rich pay packages and a 
stake in the newly private entity.”).  
 22 See Grace Wong, Rival Bidders Emerge for Big Buyouts, CNNMONEY.COM, 
Mar. 19, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/19/markets/pe_deals/index.htm [herein-
after Rival Bidders] (“The deal landscape may be growing more intense, but private 
equity firms—considered some of the savviest deal makers on Wall Street—
undoubtedly are looking out for ways to stay one step ahead of their rivals.”). 
 23 See Dennis J. Block, Public Company M&A: Recent Developments in 
Corporate Control, Protective Mechanisms and Other Deal Protection Techniques, in 
CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 2007: CURRENT OFFENSIVE & DEFENSIVE 
STRATEGIES IN M&A TRANSACTIONS, at 7, 106-07 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course 
Handbook Series No. 1584, 2007) (differentiating no shops and go-shops).  
 24 See infra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing how public auctions 
and market canvasses are the best ways to ensure the maximization of stockholder 
value).  
 25  For a description of “fiduciary out” provisions, see infra Part II.A.2. 
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party offer if it is, or may become, a superior offer.26 Thus, in 
the typical deal, a target is “closed for business” and must 
ignore advances from third parties unless an unsolicited 
superior proposal is received. By contrast, go-shop provisions 
effectively allow a target to extend its typical “store hours” and 
actively seek a better deal during the time in which it 
otherwise would have been officially closed for business.  
Although go-shop provisions initially surfaced during 
the late 1980s, the provisions received scant attention from the 
M&A community until dealmakers began utilizing the 
provisions with increasing frequency over the past three years. 
This increased use of go-shop provisions has triggered a debate 
among commentators as to the effectiveness of the provisions 
and have led some to question whether the provisions are 
merely “window dressing” enabling boards to claim that they 
have satisfied their duty to maximize stockholder value.27  
This Article demonstrates, through an examination of 
the go-shop provision’s development, that despite Revlon, 
Delaware courts have failed to take affirmative steps to 
promote the maximization of stockholder value. Furthermore, 
this Article argues that the ability of a company to extend its 
“store hours” by actively shopping post-signing has the same 
end result with respect to value maximization as the typical 
post-signing market check that relies solely on a no shop 
provision coupled with a fiduciary out. Part II of the Article 
explores the evolution of go-shop provisions.28 The section 
begins with a general discussion of deal protection devices with 
a particular focus on no shop and window shop provisions, the 
predecessors to the go-shop, and then moves into a more 
specific description of the Delaware courts’ treatment of post-
signing market checks in light of Revlon and its progeny.29 The 
  
 26 See infra notes 50-51 and 86 and accompanying text (describing fiduciary 
outs and use of fiduciary outs). Merger agreements differ on what constitutes a 
“superior offer,” with factors such as the form of consideration, certainty of closing, and 
regulatory issues often playing an important role. However, this Article assumes that 
the principal determination of whether an offer is superior is the value of consideration 
paid.  
 27 See Mark A. Morton, Partner, & Roxanne L. Houtman, Assoc., Potter 
Anderson & Corroon LLP, Go-Shops: Market Check Magic or Mirage? 1, 7-8 (May 2007), 
www.potteranderson.com/assets/attachments/Potter_Anderson_Go-Shops__rev.pdf 
(questioning whether go-shop provisions are effective or are “window dressing”). For a 
further discussion regarding the effectiveness of go-shop provisions, see infra Part 
III.A.  
 28 See infra Part II (describing the evolution of the go-shop).  
 29 See infra Part II.A-C.  
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section ends with a discussion of the development of go-shop 
provisions.30 Part III discusses the effectiveness of go-shop 
provisions, including critics’ arguments that the provisions 
have a chilling effect on the bidding process.31 This section also 
includes an examination of In re Topps Co. Shareholders 
Litigation and In re Lear Corp. Shareholders Litigation, the 
most recent Delaware cases to specifically address and validate 
go-shop provisions.32 Part IV of this Article contends that, 
despite facial differences, go-shop provisions and post-signing 
market checks are effectively the same.33 The Delaware courts’ 
continuing validation of both post-signing market checks and 
go-shop provisions reveal the courts’ hesitancy in disrupting 
signed transactions and has resulted in a movement away from 
Delaware’s policy that directors should act as auctioneers and 
conduct a sale process that will result in the maximization of 
stockholder value. Thus, I contend that this continued trend in 
Delaware jurisprudence, including the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s validation of go-shop provisions, signals the death 
of the policies, originally set forth in Revlon, promoting a more 
competitive sale process, and, ultimately, higher value 
realization for stockholders.  
II. THE RISE OF GO-SHOP PROVISIONS 
A. Deal Protection Generally  
To fully appreciate no shops, market checks, and go-
shops, one must first understand the reasons that dealmakers 
use deal protection devices generally and how typical deal 
protection devices are used in combination. In classic consumer 
shopping situations, once a consumer finds and selects a 
desired product at a price he or she is willing to pay, the 
consumer can generally rest assured that the time spent and 
money invested thus far is not for naught. In such situations, 
the time between the selection of a product and the exchange of 
money and ownership is usually limited, and thus the risk that 
an interloper will upset the transaction is likewise extremely 
small or, in most cases, nonexistent. However, the same does 
not hold true in the M&A world. 
  
 30 See infra Part II.D-E. 
 31 See infra Part III.A. 
 32 See infra Part III.B. 
 33 See infra Part IV.  
532 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2 
Unlike everyday consumer transactions, the purchase of 
a public company cannot be completed prior to the fulfillment 
of certain closing conditions. These conditions include 
stockholder approval, the preparation and filing of a proxy 
statement, and, in many cases, regulatory approval, including 
antitrust approvals, the registration of securities to be issued 
in connection with the transaction and other required third 
party consents.34 Because of the time needed to accomplish 
these required closing conditions, the interim period between 
signing the transaction agreement and closing the transaction 
can stretch anywhere from several weeks to several months, or 
beyond.35 
By the time of signing, the acquirer has devoted a 
significant amount of time and money to identifying the target 
and to assessing the target’s value.36 In addition to traditional 
sunk costs that are associated with identifying and assessing 
the value of the target, commentators have also identified 
operational costs and reputational costs that the initial 
acquirer may incur in the event that the transaction is not 
completed. For example, Professor Guhan Subramanian has 
argued that if a deal is not completed, the initial acquirer may 
suffer a decrease in its own stock price and may be viewed as 
“weak” in the market for corporate control.37 Such a reputation 
for weakness may result in the reduction of future profit 
opportunities for the acquirer because other bidders may be 
more willing to enter into a future bidding contest against a 
“weak” bidder.38 Because of these potential costs, the acquirer 
will seek to prevent its proposed transaction from being 
interrupted, or “jumped,” by a third party.  
  
 34 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in 
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 241 n.3 (1990) (listing closing 
conditions).  
 35 See id. at 241 (explaining there is generally a two to four month period 
between signing and closing); John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side 
Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 310 (2000) (stating 
that the period between signing and closing ranges from a minimum of thirty days to 
up to six months).  
 36 See Bainbridge, supra note 34, at 242 (describing purchaser’s sunk costs).  
 37 See Guhan Subramanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon 
Transactions, 28 J. CORP. L. 691, 701-02 (2003) (describing potential operational and 
reputational costs that acquirer may incur in the event of a failed deal).  
 38 See id. at 702 (describing reputational costs); see also Coates & 
Subramanian, supra note 35, at 360 (stating that bidders may decide not to enter 
future auctions if a “tough” bidder has already entered the bidding contest, or may drop 
out if a tough bidder enters).  
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On the other hand, the target’s board has an obligation 
to act in the best interests of the business and must fulfill its 
fiduciary duties to the corporation’s stockholders.39 In some 
cases, this may mean considering options that arise after the 
signing of a definitive transaction agreement as a result of a 
deal being “jumped.” In addition, the target’s stockholders may 
not approve the proposed transaction for any reason, including 
the existence of a superior third party bid. Thus, a definitive 
agreement between the initial acquirer and the target is not 
necessarily a “sure thing” because it does not effectively bind 
the target to the transaction.40 This tension between the initial 
acquirer’s costs and the non-binding nature of the agreement 
on the target and its stockholders has given rise to deal 
protection devices. As the name suggests, deal protection 
devices include a variety of contractual terms that are 
incorporated into a definitive agreement with the goal of 
protecting a deal from being “jumped” by a third party by 
making the third party’s bid riskier and more expensive.41 The 
inclusion of at least some combination of deal protection 
devices has become de rigueur in public M&A transactions.42  
The following section is a brief summary of some typical 
deal protection devices, including no shops, window shops, no 
talk provisions, termination or break-up fees, and matching 
rights. In addition, this section also focuses on “fiduciary outs,” 
which act as important exceptions to deal protection devices. 
This section, as well as the remainder of this Article, addresses 
how dealmakers use these devices in combination and how the 
Delaware courts have treated the results of such combinations.  
  
 39 For a discussion of a board’s fiduciary duties in a change of control context, 
see infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.  
 40 See note 86 and accompanying text. There also are reasons why the target 
may want a binding definitive agreement. For example, if the acquirer backs out, the 
target risks being left “in play” without another buyer. Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection 
Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1900-01 (2003) 
(describing a target’s reasons for avoiding non-binding agreements). In addition, an 
unsolicited bid from a financial buyer may not present the same opportunities for 
synergy that the signed deal with a strategic buyer may be capable of. See id. 
 41 See id. at 1902-03 (describing why deal protection mechanisms are used); 
see also McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 506 n.62 (Del. Ch. 2000) (stating 
that deal protection devices make “it more difficult and more expensive to consummate 
a competing transaction and . . . provid[e] compensation to the odd company out if such 
an alternative deal nonetheless occurs”).  
 42 See Block, supra note 23, at 89 (stating that acquirers and targets will 
often bargain for deal protection devices); Coates & Subramanian, supra note 35, at 
315 (indicating that, by 1998, lock-ups appeared in 80% of deals and termination fees 
appeared in 70% of deals).  
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1. No Shop Provisions, Window Shop Provisions, and  
No Talk Provisions 
Although the term “no shop” can refer to a variety of 
covenants in an M&A agreement, pure no shop provisions 
prevent a target’s board from actively soliciting bids after the 
target has entered into a definitive agreement with an initial 
acquirer.43 Similarly, window shop provisions prevent a target 
from actively soliciting bids from third parties after the signing 
of a definitive agreement.44 However, a window shop provision 
contains a fiduciary out that allows the target’s board to 
negotiate with, provide due diligence materials to, and, if 
appropriate, ultimately accept a bid from a third party that 
makes an unsolicited offer if taking such action is necessary to 
avoid a breach of the board’s fiduciary duties.45 Typically, 
window shop provisions require that the unsolicited third party 
bid meet certain criteria in order to exercise the fiduciary out; 
among these requirements is that the third party bid be 
deemed a superior proposal to that of the incumbent bidder.46 
Although technically slightly different, the terms “no shop” and 
“window shop” are frequently referred to interchangeably and 
will be referred to interchangeably throughout this Article.  
Conversely, no talk provisions prevent the target from 
actively soliciting potential third party bids and from 
negotiating with, or providing due diligence or other 
information to, a third party who has submitted an unsolicited 
offer, despite the terms of the unsolicited offer.47 In essence, as 
the name suggests, no talk provisions prevent targets from 
speaking with interested third parties altogether, unless the 
target has permission from the initial acquirer. Practitioners 
have viewed no talk provisions that do not contain fiduciary 
outs as per se invalid because they can prevent a target’s board 
  
 43 Block, supra note 23, at 91. Block indicates that pure no shops are 
generally not permissible in transactions resulting in a change of control of the target 
unless the target’s board has already fulfilled their Revlon duties by conducting an 
auction. Id. at 93. For a further discussion of a board’s Revlon duties and related sale 
methods, see infra notes 63-86 and accompanying text.  
 44 Block, supra note 23, at 91.  
 45 Id. For a further discussion of fiduciary out clauses, see discussion infra 
Part II.A.2.  
 46 See Block, supra note 23, at 92 (listing typical window shop fiduciary out 
requirements). 
 47 See id. at 91 (describing no talk provisions); Thanos Panagopoulos, 
Thinking Inside the Box: Analyzing Judicial Scrutiny of Deal Protection Devices in 
Delaware, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 437, 446 (2006) (same).  
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from fulfilling their fiduciary duties, which the Delaware Court 
of Chancery has stated is the “legal equivalent of willful 
blindness.”48 
Delaware courts analyze the validity of no shop 
provisions based on the particular facts and circumstances of a 
given case. Accordingly, courts will uphold no shop provisions 
where they “do not foreclose other offers, but operate merely to 
afford some protection to prevent disruption of the Agreement 
by proposals from third parties that are neither bona fide nor 
likely to result in a higher transaction.”49  
2. Fiduciary Outs 
Although fiduciary outs are not deal protection devices, 
fiduciary outs are used with deal protection devices to ensure 
the validity of the devices. Fiduciary outs are contractual 
clauses that allow the target to perform an act that the 
agreement otherwise forbids (or to refrain from doing an act 
that the contract requires) if the performance of the forbidden 
act (or non-performance of the required act) would otherwise 
result in a violation of a board’s fiduciary duties.50 When a 
board exercises its fiduciary out, the resulting act, or failure to 
act, is not considered to be a contractual breach.51 Thus, the 
fiduciary out acts as a safe harbor to the deal protection 
mechanism. 
3. Termination or Break-Up Fees 
No shops are often paired with termination or break-up 
fees that are payable by the target to the incumbent bidder 
  
 48 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Nos. CIV. A. 17398, 
CIV. A. 17383, CIV. A. 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) (“No-
talk provisions . . . are troubling precisely because they prevent a board from meeting 
its duty to make an informed judgment with respect to even considering whether to 
negotiate with a third party.”); see also Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 106-
09 (Del. Ch. 1999) (suggesting that no talk provisions are invalid); Karl L. Balz, No-
Shop Clauses, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513, 545 (2003) (describing the validity of no talk 
provisions and scenarios where no talk provisions may be deemed valid). 
 49 Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280, 291 
(Del. Ch. 1998).  
 50 See William T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and the 
Why of an Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. LAW. 653, 653-54 (2000) (defining fiduciary 
outs).  
 51 See id. at 654.  
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upon the occurrence of specific circumstances.52 Typical 
triggering events include the termination of an agreement 
following (1) the target board’s withdrawal, modification or 
change in its recommendation of the proposed transaction; (2) 
the target board’s recommendation of a competing proposal; (3) 
the target board’s exercise of a fiduciary out in favor of a 
superior proposal; or (4) the stockholders’ failure to approve the 
proposed transaction.53 Delaware courts have upheld 
termination fees ranging from 1% to 6% of the target’s equity 
value.54 Generally, however, dealmakers include termination 
fees ranging from 1% to 5% of transaction value, with a median 
of approximately 2.6% to 3%.55  
In the event that a deal falls through, termination fees 
guarantee that the initial acquirer will at least be compensated 
for the fees and expenses that it incurred in negotiating  
the underlying agreement.56 Although the target incurs the 
termination fee, the fee is considered a transaction cost for  
  
 52 Termination fees can also be payable by an acquirer to the target in certain 
situations, including where the acquirer breaches an agreement and fails to 
consummate the transaction. Fees payable by the acquirer to a target are known as 
reverse termination fees.  
 53 See Block, supra note 23, at 115-16 (describing typical triggering events for 
termination fees).  
 54 See id. at 110 (describing current practices relating to termination fees). 
The courts treat termination fees as liquidated damages and rely on authority stating 
that liquidated damage provisions equal to between 1% and 5% of the proposed 
acquisition price are reasonable. See Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Margaux, Inc., 674 A.2d 
889, 897 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (citing Bainbridge, supra note 34, at 245). Despite 
treating termination fees as liquidated damages, the Delaware courts refuse to issue a 
bright-line rule regarding the acceptable percentage of termination fees. See La. Mun. 
Police Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(“Though a ‘3% rule’ for termination fees might be convenient for transaction planners, 
it is simply too blunt an instrument, too subject to abuse, for this Court to bless as a 
blanket rule.”). However, in dicta, the Delaware Court of Chancery has indicated that a 
termination fee of 6.3% “certainly seems to stretch the definition of range of 
reasonableness and probably stretches the definition beyond its breaking point.” Phelps 
Dodge, Nos. CIV. A. 17398, CIV. A. 17383, CIV. A. 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *2. For 
further examples of termination fees that the Delaware Court of Chancery have 
upheld, see infra note 112.  
 55 See Block, supra note 23, at 110 (describing typical termination fees).  
 56 See Kysor Indus., 674 A.2d at 897 (stating that termination fees act as a 
form of reimbursement for the initial bidder’s lost opportunities and expenditures); 
Panagopoulos, supra note 47, at 445 (describing the purposes of termination fees). 
Generally, “the more closely a fee resembles the actual and economic costs incurred by 
a party the more likely it is to be upheld by a court.” Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M. 
Raju, A Process Based Model for Analyzing Deal Protection Measures, 55 BUS. LAW. 
1609, 1613 (2000).  
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the topping bidder.57 Thus, termination fees may act as 
disincentives for third parties who are considering “jumping” a 
deal because they make the topping bid more expensive.58  
4. Matching Rights 
In addition to termination fees, no shops are commonly 
paired with matching rights, also referred to as topping or last-
look rights. Matching rights require the target to inform the 
incumbent bidder of a superior proposal and allow the 
incumbent bidder a period during which the incumbent bidder 
may match, or exceed, the unsolicited superior proposal.59 Thus, 
matching rights have the capability of creating a post-signing 
bidding war between the initial acquirer and one or more 
interlopers who have submitted superior proposals.  
Matching rights act as deal protection devices because 
they deter potential bidders from “jumping in” post-signing 
since potential bidders are aware that the initial acquirer may 
submit another bid matching, or exceeding, the superior 
proposal.60  
5. Go-Shop Provisions 
As previously discussed, go-shop provisions appear to be 
the opposite of no shop provisions.61 Go-shops allow a target  
to actively solicit buyers after the target has already entered 
into a definitive agreement with a purchaser. Although 
commentators tend to refer to go-shop provisions as deal 
protection devices, I contend that go-shops are more similar to 
fiduciary outs because they allow the target company to 
  
 57 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2003) 
(“To the extent that defensive measures are economic and reasonable, they may become 
an increased cost to the proponent of any subsequent transaction.”).  
 58 See Panagopoulos, supra note 47, at 445; Judd F. Sneirson, Merger 
Agreements, Termination Fees, and the Contract-Corporate Tension, 2002 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 573, 581-82 (providing examples illustrating how termination fees deter topping 
bids).  
 59 See Block, supra note 23, at 117 (describing typical matching rights). 
Generally, matching rights also require the target to inform the initial acquirer of the 
identity of the person who submitted the superior proposal. Id. In addition, the initial 
acquirer is typically given three business days’ notice of a possible termination. Id. 
Once the initial acquirer is given notice, the matching rights provision usually requires 
that the target negotiate in good faith with the initial acquirer so that the initial 
acquirer may make a superior proposal. Id.  
 60 Id. 
 61 See infra Part IV. 
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actively solicit other bidders following signing and could result 
in the termination of an agreement in favor of a superior 
proposal.62 A more in-depth discussion of the typical 
characteristics of go-shop provisions is set forth in Part II.E. 
B. Fiduciary Duties of the Board 
Over the past several years, practitioners, academics, 
and jurists have wrestled with the judicial standard of review 
applicable to deal protection devices, an issue that this Article 
does not seek to address.63 However, it is clear since Revlon 
that once a board of directors contemplates a transaction that 
will cause either a change in corporate control64 or a breakup  
of the corporate entity, the board is obligated to seek the  
best present value reasonably available to stockholders.65 
  
 62 See, e.g., Block, supra note 23, at 91, 106 (grouping go-shop provisions with 
deal protection devices).  
 63 See Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A Fresh Look at Deal 
Protection Devices: Out from the Shadow of the Omnipresent Specter, 26 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 975, 975-76 (2001) (stating that academics, practitioners, and jurists have long 
debated the appropriate standard of review for deal protection devices and noting that 
the Delaware Court of Chancery has struggled with the issue); see also Balz, supra note 
48, at 527-44 (analyzing the appropriate standard of review applicable to no shop 
provisions); Stephen J. Lubben & Alana J. Darnell, Delaware’s Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 589, 627 (2006) (arguing that the duty of care standard should be applied to 
deal protection devices unless the merger is a defensive measure); Panagopoulos, supra 
note 47, at 448-71 (examining and critiquing the judicial standards applicable to deal 
protection devices). See generally Symposium, Judicial Standards of Review of 
Corporate Fiduciary Action, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 995, 1059-82 (2001) (transcript of a 
symposium session at which jurists, practitioners, and scholars debated the standards 
of review applicable to corporate actions and, in particular, to deal protection devices).  
 64 This Article does not seek to define what constitutes a “change of control 
transaction,” which Delaware jurists recognize to be an unanswered question. See 
William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in 
Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 895 n.130 (2001) (former 
chancellor and his co-authors recognizing that courts have yet to fully address what 
constitutes a change of control under Delaware law); see also In re TW Servs., Inc. 
S’holders Litig., CIV. A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 
1989) (asking when Revlon duties apply). 
 65 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 
(Del. 1986) (holding that a board’s act of authorizing management to negotiate a 
merger or buyout is a recognition that the company is for sale and changes the board’s 
duty from the “preservation of . . . a corporate entity to the maximization of the 
company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit”); see also Allen et al., supra note 
64, at 894 (“Where directors have decided to commit the corporation to a change of 
control transaction, their actions must be evaluated solely by reference to their duty to 
obtain the highest value reasonably available.”). The Delaware Supreme Court has 
held that Revlon duties attach 
when a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or 
to effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the 
company. . . . [or where], in response to a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its 
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Additionally, a board’s favoritism of a particular bidder over 
another is permitted only if the board’s objective is to maximize 
the stockholders’ value of their shares.66 However, the board 
need not maintain a “level playing field” at all times.67 The 
Supreme Court has recognized that, because today’s corporate 
and financial environment is continuously evolving, “no single 
blueprint” exists for a board to satisfy its Revlon duties.68 
Although “no single blueprint” exists, a transaction with 
the highest bidder following a full public auction is the most 
desirable way in which a board can satisfy Revlon’s enhanced 
scrutiny test.69 In fact, the Delaware Supreme Court held that 
in a change of control situation, “a board’s primary duty 
becomes that of an auctioneer responsible for selling the 
company to the highest bidder.”70 The board is also required to 
take steps that foster, rather than impede, bidding, which will 
presumably result in the maximization of stockholder value.71 
Following Revlon, the Delaware courts have held that a 
full-blown public auction is not necessarily a requirement for 
change of control transactions for all corporations under 
Delaware law.72 Indeed, there are certain situations in which  
  
long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the 
breakup of the company. 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990) (citation 
omitted).  
 66 In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 64 (Del. Ch. 2007).  
 67 See In re TW Servs., 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (holding that there is no duty to 
conduct an auction or maintain a “level playing field” when a company is for sale).  
 68 Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989). 
 69 See Morton & Houtman, supra note 27, at 1 (stating that transactions with 
the highest bidder after either a full public auction or a slightly more limited market 
check in which a number of bidders are contacted directly and participate in bidding 
likely satisfies a board’s Revlon duties); Mark W. Peters et al., Emergence of the “Go-
Shop,” 11 WALLSTREETLAYWER.COM: SEC. ELECTRONIC AGE 7 (2007) (indicating that 
the most desirable way for the board of a target to fulfill its Revlon duties is to conduct 
a full public auction and enter into an agreement with the bidder making the highest 
offer). However, even when a full-blown public auction is conducted, the definitive 
agreement must still contain a fiduciary out. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.  
 70 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.  
 71 See id. at 183 (stating that the result of the lock-up in Revlon “was not to 
foster bidding, but to destroy it”).  
 72 See Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286 (“Revlon does not demand that every change 
in the control of a Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated bidding contest.”); In 
re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[T]he 
[Delaware] Supreme Court has held that the duty to take reasonable steps to secure 
the highest immediately available price does not invariably require a board to conduct 
an auction process or even a targeted market canvass in the first instance, 
emphasizing that there is ‘no single blue-print’ for fulfilling the duty to maximize 
value.”). However, small micro-cap companies may not be able to rely on a limited 
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a public auction is not desirable, as boards may view public 
auctions as placing the company at a competitive disadvan-
tage.73 For example, if a company conducts a public auction, the 
company risks losing employees, customers and suppliers.74 In 
addition, the company also runs the risk of being viewed by the 
market for corporate control as “damaged goods” if the 
company does not receive any indications of interest or if the 
board determines that the offers it receives are inadequate.75 
Thus, in the event of a failed auction, it may take some time for 
a company to successfully sell itself.76 Furthermore, although 
potential bidders are required to execute confidentiality 
agreements before being provided with a confidential offering 
memorandum or commencing due diligence, companies also 
risk disclosure of proprietary or sensitive information to the 
public and to other competitors.77 In addition, in some cases, 
the target may have already been approached by a potential 
purchaser whose bid may be lost if the target board were to 
choose to engage in a full blown auction.78 As a result, target 
boards may be faced with a situation in which they are 
interested in exploring change of control possibilities but do not 
desire to actively pursue a public auction.  
In these situations, targets often choose to engage in a 
more limited pre-signing market canvass.79 That is, a target, or 
  
public auction or post-signing market check. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying 
text.  
 73 The Delaware Court of Chancery also recognizes the potential risks 
involved with a public auction. See In re MONY Group Inc. S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 
21 (Del. Ch. 2004) (recognizing benefits to single bidder approaches).  
 74 See Peters et al., supra note 69 (listing reasons why boards choose not to 
conduct public bidding processes).  
 75 Heath Price Tarbert, Merger Breakup Fees: A Critical Challenge to Anglo-
American Corporate Law, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 627, 633-34 (2003) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing F. George Davitt, Orchestrating Takeover Talks: The 
Corporate Board, SF86 ALI-ABA 677 (2001)) (describing the possibility that customers, 
suppliers, and potential acquirers may view a target as “damaged goods” upon the 
failure of a transaction).  
 76 See Embarking on the Sale Process, in ABA COMMITTEE ON NEGOTIATED 
ACQUISITIONS, THE M&A PROCESS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE BUSINESS LAWYER 93, 
93-94 (2005) (detailing the disadvantages of auctions, including the length of time it 
takes to sell a company after a failed auction).  
 77 See In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 62 (Del. Ch. 2007) (noting 
the target’s “legitimate proprietary concerns” about turning over information to a 
competitor).  
 78 See, e.g., id. at 61 (stating that the buyer’s bid was contingent on the target 
not conducting a public auction); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 104 (Del. 
Ch. 2007) (same).  
 79 See Morton & Houtman, supra note 27, at 1 (stating that a transaction 
with the highest bidder occurring after a more limited market check in which a number 
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more likely its financial advisor, will contact a select group of 
potential bidders, who may be interested in purchasing the 
target. Because only a limited number of potential purchasers 
are contacted, the risks associated with a pre-signing market 
canvass are not as great as with a public auction since the 
target company has not been placed “on the auction block.”  
In addition to a public auction or a more limited pre-
signing market canvass, Delaware courts have repeatedly 
validated a target board’s more exclusive reliance on a no shop 
with a fiduciary out or a window shop provision,80 also known 
as a post-signing market check. This alternative, as previously 
discussed,81 permits the target to terminate the definitive 
agreement in favor of an unsolicited proposal that would  
result in a better deal with a third party. As Part II.C will 
demonstrate, the Delaware courts’ repeated blessing of a 
target’s reliance on post-signing market checks in the absence 
of a public auction or targeted market canvass has made the 
post-signing market check a third sale method for targets. It is 
worth noting, however, that recent Delaware jurisprudence 
indicates that small micro-cap companies82 may need to engage 
in a more complete targeted market canvass rather than rely 
on a post-signing market check.83 In such a situation, the 
rationale for a more complete pre-signing market canvass is 
that micro-cap companies do not attract as much attention 
from the market for corporate control as their large-cap 
counterparts attract and micro-cap companies are less likely to 
  
of bidders are contacted directly and participate in bidding likely satisfies a board’s 
Revlon duties).  
 80 See, e.g., In re MONY Group Inc. S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 23-24 (Del. 
Ch. 2004); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 691, 705-07 (Del. Ch. 2001); In re Fort 
Howard Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 9991, 1988 WL 83147, at *12-13 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 8, 1988).  
 81  See discussion supra Part II.A.1 (describing no shop and window shop 
provisions).  
 82 According to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s proposed 
regulation of smaller companies, micro-cap companies are “companies whose 
outstanding common stock (or equivalent) in the aggregate comprises the lowest 1% of 
total U.S. equity market capitalization” or, in other words, those companies whose 
market capitalization is less than approximately $128.2 million. Exposure Draft of 
Final Report of Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, 71 Fed. Reg. 
11,090, 11,092 (May 3, 2006). Under the same recommendation, large-cap companies 
are those companies whose outstanding common stock (or equivalent) accounts for 94% 
of total U.S. equity market capitalization or, in other words, those companies whose 
market capitalization is more than approximately $787.1 million. See id. (table). 
 83 See In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 197-99 (Del. 
Ch. 2007) (finding that targeting of private equity buyers and not strategic buyers was 
likely a breach of Revlon duties). 
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be hostile takeover targets.84 Thus, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery found that a micro-cap company’s limited pre-signing 
market canvass and the reliance on a post-signing market 
check did not adequately fulfill a board’s duties to maximize 
stockholder value.85 Nonetheless, even when a large-cap or 
micro-cap company has engaged in a public auction or limited 
pre-signing market check, agreements must still contain a 
fiduciary out in order to allow the target board to fulfill its 
Revlon duties between signing and the stockholders’ approval 
of the proposed transaction.86  
C. Before the Rise of the Go-Shop: Post-Signing Market 
Checks 
In the wake of Revlon, Delaware courts have repeatedly 
addressed the intensity of the post-signing market check 
necessary to satisfy a board’s Revlon duties in the absence of a 
public auction or other pre-signing market canvass, or in the 
event that a target conducted only a very limited market 
canvass.87 However, the courts, and in particular the Delaware 
Court of Chancery, are constrained by the context in which 
these cases arise. The plaintiffs in these cases are typically the 
  
 84 Id. at 197-98; see also In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 123 n.22 (stating that 
strategic buyers of micro-cap companies in niche markets are not likely to make 
unsolicited proposals without prior discussions or information).  
 85 In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 199.  
 86 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2003) 
(“The directors of a Delaware corporation have a continuing obligation to discharge 
their fiduciary responsibilities, as future circumstances develop, after a merger 
agreement is announced.”). In Omnicare, the majority opinion made it clear that the 
target company’s board of directors was required to negotiate a fiduciary out clause to 
protect its stockholders in the event that the proposed transaction became an inferior 
offer. Id. The majority stated that by failing to include a fiduciary out clause, the target 
board had effectively “disabled itself from exercising its own fiduciary obligations at a 
time when the board’s own judgment is most important, i.e., receipt of a subsequent 
superior offer.” Id.  
 87 See, e.g., In re MONY Group Inc. S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 23-24 (Del. 
Ch. 2004); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 705-07 (Del. Ch. 
2001); Kohls v. Duthie, 765 A.2d 1274, 1285 (Del. Ch. 2000); Goodwin v. Live Entm’t, 
Inc., No. Civ.A. 15765, 1999 WL 64265, at *23 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 1999); Matador 
Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280, 291 (Del. Ch. 1998); In re 
MCA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 598 A.2d 687, 693 (Del. Ch. 1991); In re Vitalink Commc’ns 
Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 12085, 1991 WL 238816, at *7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 
1991); Roberts v. Gen. Instrument Corp., Civ. A. No. 11639, 1990 WL 118356, at *8-9 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990); Braunschweiger v. Am. Home Shield Corp., Civ. A. No. 10755, 
1989 WL 128571, at *6-7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1989); In re KDI Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. 
A. No. 10,278, 1988 WL 116448, at *5-7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988); In re Fort Howard 
Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 9991, 1988 WL 83147, at *12-13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 
1988).  
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stockholders of a target company or a scorned third party 
bidder who raise challenges to the market check in a motion 
seeking to enjoin an impending merger. The courts thus view 
these cases from the position of a Monday morning sports 
commentator, attempting to determine whether the board’s 
actions were reasonable, not perfect, in light of the 
circumstances at the time of the decision.88 In the words of Vice 
Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Court of Chancery, “[T]his 
reasonableness review is more searching than rationality 
review, and there is less tolerance for slack by the directors.”89 
As a result, the trend in Delaware jurisprudence is to consider 
the sale process as a whole. The courts consider a variety of 
factors to determine whether the sale process used resulted in 
a transaction that maximizes stockholder value. Among these 
factors are the target’s pre-signing market position;90 whether 
the special committee, if one was formed, was truly 
independent and how the special committee conducted the sale 
process;91 whether a truly independent financial advisor was 
engaged;92 and whether the stockholders were fully informed of 
the sale process.93  
The emphasis on this myriad of factors appears to have 
shifted the Delaware courts’ attention away from taking 
affirmative steps to promote the maximization of stockholder 
value. As mentioned previously, Delaware jurisprudence over 
  
 88 See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 
1994) (“[C]ourt[s] applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the 
directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. If a board selected one of 
several reasonable alternatives, a court should not second-guess that choice even 
though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events may have cast doubt on 
the board’s determination.” (emphasis omitted)); In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 118 
(“Reasonableness, not perfection, measured in business terms relevant to value 
creation, rather than by what creates the most sterile smell, is the metric.”). 
 89 In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 192.  
 90 See, e.g., In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 118-19 (considering investments made in 
the company and elimination of poison pill as indications to the market that the 
company was for sale); In re Pennaco, 787 A.2d at 705 (considering the target’s position 
in the market for corporate control, including whether strategic buyers had expressed 
interest in the company).  
 91 See, e.g., In re Fort Howard, 1988 WL 83147, at *12 (examining special 
committee’s actions).  
 92 See, e.g., In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1006 n.46 
(Del. Ch. 2005) (commenting on fees that the investment bank stood to gain if the 
target chose to go with a particular transaction and stating that “[i]n general . . . it is 
advisable that investment banks representing sellers not create the appearance that 
they desire buy-side work”).  
 93 See, e.g., In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 110-14 (evaluating whether the extent of 
stockholder disclosure met fiduciary requirements); In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 
926 A.2d 58, 91-92 (Del. Ch. 2007) (scrutinizing stockholder disclosure). 
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the past twenty years reveals that as long as the deal 
protection devices do not effectively lock up the transaction,  
the Delaware courts will bless whatever sale method is used.  
A detailed description of significant market check cases  
follows to clearly demonstrate the direction of Delaware Court 
of Chancery jurisprudence regarding stockholder value 
maximization over the past two decades.  
1. In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litigation 
In 1988, two years after the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
decision in Revlon, the Court of Chancery first addressed the 
validity of a post-signing market check in In re Fort Howard 
Corp. Shareholders Litigation.94 In that case, Fort Howard’s 
board, fearing that the company may be vulnerable to a 
takeover attempt while its stock was temporarily depressed, 
sought advice from its financial advisor, Morgan Stanley, 
regarding steps the company could take to protect its 
stockholders.95 Over the course of several meetings, Morgan 
Stanley and Fort Howard determined that an LBO of the 
company involving Morgan Stanley acting as a principal and 
Fort Howard’s senior management also participating would 
create a greater value than other alternatives.96 After 
  
 94 In re Fort Howard, 1988 WL 83147, at *1. Some commentators cite to a 
preceding case, Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., 1988 WL 8772 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1988), 
as having first addressed the validity of a post-signing market check. Although the 
merger agreement in that case contained a window shop provision and the target 
company only seriously negotiated with one bidder prior to signing the agreement, the 
plaintiffs did not specifically challenge the target’s reliance on a post-signing market 
check but rather challenged the validity of the pre-signing auction process. Yanow, 
1988 WL 8772, at *3-4. In particular, the plaintiffs challenged the target’s decision to 
only negotiate with one bidder without having first conducted an auction or, at least, 
having discreetly contacted third parties that had previously expressed an interest in 
the target. Id. at *4. In addition, then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs also focused on the pre-
signing market canvass in finding that although it was not clear that the market was 
fully informed that the target was for sale, the “undisputed evidence [was] that for the 
last two years, the relevant ‘players’ in the industry were aware that [the target] was 
willing to (and, indeed, had) entertained acquisition proposals.” Id. at *6.  
 95 In re Fort Howard, 1988 WL 83147, at *2.  
 96 Id. During the initial meeting on March 30, 1988, Fort Howard’s CEO 
asked about a wide range of transactions, including recapitalizations, spin-offs, 
acquisitions and other transactions. Id. Morgan Stanley described the structure and 
mechanics of different types of recapitalizations and then mentioned that an LBO of 
the company with Morgan Stanley acting as a principal was also an alternative. Id. On 
May 3, Fort Howard management requested Morgan Stanley to evaluate the company’s 
possible alternatives and, three weeks later, Morgan Stanley presented a written 
report at a meeting with management. Id. During this meeting, Morgan Stanley 
indicated that in its opinion an LBO of the company would result in the greatest 
 
2008] FROM NO SHOPS TO GO-SHOPS 545 
management presented the LBO proposal to the board, the 
board formed a special committee that initially elected to keep 
the buyout proposal confidential, although the company later 
issued press releases regarding the negotiations.97 The special 
committee retained an independent financial advisor, who 
advised that if the board accepted an LBO proposal, the 
proposal should provide for a market test to determine whether 
a third party could make a better offer.98  
Ultimately, Fort Howard and the Morgan Stanley group 
entered into a merger agreement that included a no shop 
provision allowing Fort Howard to receive third party proposals 
but prevented management from actively soliciting alternative 
offers.99 The agreement also included a topping fee and expense 
reimbursement provision capped at $67 million, which 
represented 1.9% of the equity value of the transaction.100 
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the tender offer would 
be publicly known for thirty business days, or forty-three 
calendar days.101 Thus, the agreement essentially provided for a 
forty-three day market check period, which came to be 
standard in transactions following Fort Howard.  
Upon execution of the merger agreement, Fort Howard 
issued a press release that announced the transaction and 
specifically stated that management was available to receive 
  
stockholder value and again stated that Morgan Stanley would be interested in 
participating in such a transaction with Fort Howard’s senior management. Id.  
 97 Id. at *3-5. On June 22, 1988, after the company received a telephone 
inquiry regarding a rumor that there was a buyout being negotiated, Fort Howard 
issued a press release stating that “members of [Fort Howard’s] management intend to 
seek a proposal with third parties to acquire the Company in a leveraged buyout.” Id. 
at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). On June 24, the company issued another 
press release stating that it was engaged in negotiations with a group consisting of 
members of its senior management and an affiliate of Morgan Stanley for an LBO, but 
that there was no assurance that the transaction would come to fruition. Id. at *6-7.  
 98 Id. at *4-5. After receiving Morgan Stanley’s initial draft merger 
agreement that included a proposal to purchase all of the outstanding company shares 
for $50 per share and provided for a broad prohibition against shopping the company, 
the special committee demanded a market test and indicated that it would not go 
forward with the LBO unless there was time to test the market and there were fewer 
restrictions on its ability to do so. Id. at *5-6. Among the other provisions in the initial 
draft that the Special Committee rejected were provisions allowing for unspecified 
break-up fees, unlimited expense reimbursement, and “a provision acknowledging 
Morgan Stanley’s right to commence and complete any tender offer with[in] twenty 
days from the announcement of its [definitive] agreement.” Id. at *5.  
 99 Id. at *7. 
 100 Id.; see also Morton & Houtman, supra note 27, at 2 (explaining the Fort 
Howard deal’s protection provisions).  
 101 In re Fort Howard, 1988 WL 83147, at *6.  
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inquiries from interested parties.102 Following the press release, 
the company received eight inquiries from third parties, but 
only two of the eight pursued the transaction further, including 
a competitor of Fort Howard that ended up being the only third 
party to seriously pursue a transaction with Fort Howard.103 
When the competitor requested additional information beyond 
the information provided to the other potential bidders, the 
special committee expressed concerns that the competitor 
would face significant antitrust problems and possibly 
financing problems in acquiring Fort Howard.104 As a result  
of these alleged concerns, the confidentiality/standstill105 
agreement that the committee sought to have the competitor 
execute contained several provisions that did not exist in the 
Morgan Stanley confidentiality agreement. These provisions 
included a fee of $67.8 million that the competitor would have 
to pay if, after being provided with the additional confidential 
information, the competitor did not make a bid, Morgan 
Stanley’s tender offer did not close, and another bidder did not 
appear.106  
Fort Howard stockholders challenged the deal, arguing, 
inter alia, that the independent committee had engaged in a 
course of conduct that would never effectively allow it to shop 
  
 102 Id. at *7. In particular, the press release provided: 
Notwithstanding its recommendation, and consistent with the terms of the 
merger agreement, the Special Committee directed the Company’s 
management and the First Boston Corporation to be available to receive 
inquiries from any other parties interested in the possible acquisition of the 
Company and, as appropriate, to provide information and, in First Boston’s 
case in conjunction with the Special Committee, enter into discussions and 
negotiations with such parties in connection with any such indicated interest. 
Id. Following the press release, the Fort Howard transaction was prominently featured 
in the business section of several publications, including the New York Times, Wall 
Street Journal, and Los Angeles Times. Id. at *8.  
 103 Id. at *8. The Special Committee instructed its financial advisor to screen 
the proposed bidders to determine if they were capable of completing a transaction of 
this size. Id. After it was determined that all eight bidders could be considered serious 
contenders, each received additional materials that had previously been provided to 
Morgan Stanley. Id.  
 104 Id.  
 105 A standstill provision in a confidentiality agreement “prevents a 
subsequent bidder who enters from becoming hostile to the target. The subsequent 
bidder will typically be restricted from making a public tender offer and will, rather, 
join a process in which the target's board is not only included, but will ultimately 
choose its merger partner.” Block, supra note 23, at 93.  
 106 Id. at *9. During later negotiations, the special committee removed the 
$67.8 million fee and offered another alternative that required the competitor to 
submit a bid by August 5. Id.  
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the company and that the market check period was really a 
sham, pointing to the confidentiality/standstill agreement as 
proof that the special committee favored the management-
affiliated transaction.107 In denying the plaintiffs’ request for a 
preliminary injunction, then-Chancellor Allen noted that there 
may be grounds for suspicion regarding the special committee’s 
good faith, but under the totality of the circumstances, there 
was not enough to find the shareholders’ argument 
persuasive.108 Instead, Chancellor Allen focused on whether the 
special committee’s post-signing market check was a mere 
formality or whether it actually checked the market for 
superior offers. The Chancellor blessed the post-signing market 
check, finding that it “was reasonably calculated to (and did) 
effectively probe the market for alternative possible 
transactions” because it was not overly burdened by lock-ups, 
termination fees, topping fees, time, or administrative 
complications “to permit the inference that [the] alternative 
was a sham designed from the outset to be ineffective or 
minimally effective.”109 The court focused on the company’s 
press release, the fact that a number of potential bidders 
quickly expressed interest, and the company’s prompt provision 
of information to bidders.110  
Following its seminal decision in Fort Howard, the 
Court of Chancery continued to consider the effectiveness of 
post-signing market checks in a number of cases.111 The post-
signing market checks of the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
modeled after the Fort Howard market check and came to be 
  
 107 See id. at *10.  
 108 Id. at *12. Among other things, Chancellor Allen looked with suspicion on 
the fact that the CEO, in effect, chose the members of the special committee and the 
special counsel for the committee. Id.  
 109 Id. at *13. It is interesting to note, however, that Chancellor Allen found 
the special committee’s initial decision to keep the management’s buyout proposal 
secret to be suspicious, describing it as “a decision to sell the Company to management 
if it would pay a fair price, but not to inquire whether another would pay a fair price if 
management would not do so.” Id. at *12. Chancellor Allen explained that this decision 
implied a bias on the part of the special committee. Id.  
 110 Id. at *13. 
 111 See, e.g., Kohls v. Duthie, 765 A.2d 1274, 1285 (Del. Ch. 2000); Goodwin v. 
Live Entm’t, Inc., No. Civ.A. 15765, 1999 WL 64265, at *23 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 1999); 
Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings, Inc., 729 A.2d 280, 291 (Del. Ch. 1998); 
In re Vitalink Commc’ns Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 12085, 1991 WL 238816, at 
*7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1991); Roberts v. Gen. Instrument Corp., Civ. A. No. 11639, 1990 
WL 118356, at *8-9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990); Braunschweiger v. Am. Home Shield 
Corp., Civ.A. No. 10755, 1989 WL 128571, at *6-7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1989); In re KDI 
Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10,278, 1988 WL 116448, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 
1988). 
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characterized by termination fees ranging from 1.9% to 3.83%112 
and, often times, press releases announcing, or at least 
implying, that the company was open to receiving inquiries 
from other bidders.113 In addition, in these transactions, 
matching rights were not necessarily always provided to the 
initial acquirer.114 There appears to have been a seven-year gap 
during which the Court of Chancery was not presented with a 
case involving post-signing market checks but the court began 
to address them again in 1998.  
2. In re Pennaco Energy, Inc.  
More recently, in 2001, the Court of Chancery again 
visited post-signing market checks in In re Pennaco Energy, 
Inc.115 In that case, Pennaco Energy’s stockholders challenged 
the board’s decision to not actively shop the company and to 
  
 112 See, e.g., Kohls, 765 A.2d at 1285 (refusing to enjoin a deal with a 
termination fee of 2.25% of the equity value of the transaction); see also Kenetech 
Corp., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form 8-K, exhibit 2), at 1, 14, 44 (Oct. 26, 2000) 
(filing Merger Agreement, dated October 25, 2000, containing capitalization 
representation stating that 31,970,164 shares of common stock were issued and 
outstanding, merger consideration of $1.04 per share and termination fee of $750,000); 
Goodwin, 1999 WL 64265, at *20 (refusing to enjoin a deal with a termination fee equal 
to 3.125% of the merger value plus $1 million in expenses for a total percentage of 
4.16%); Matador Capital Mgmt., 720 A.2d at 291 (refusing to enjoin a deal with a 
termination fee of approximately 3.83% of the equity value of the transaction); In re 
Vitalink, 1991 WL 238816, at *7 (finding that a termination fee equal to 1.9% of the 
equity value of the transaction did not prevent a market canvass); Roberts, 1990 WL 
118356, at *9 (refusing to enjoin a deal with a termination fee equal to 2% of the equity 
value of the transaction); Braunschweiger, 1989 WL 128571, at *7 (refusing to enjoin a 
deal with a termination fee equal to $0.25 per share, or 1.9% of the equity value of the 
transaction).  
 113 Compare Kenetech Corp., Press Release (Form 8-K, exhibit 99.1), at 1 (Oct. 
26, 2000) (explicitly stating that Kenetech’s financial advisor was available to receive 
unsolicited inquiries), and In re KDI, 1988 WL 116448, at *4 (summarizing a press 
release stating that the target’s special committee and its financial advisor would 
continue to be available to receive inquiries and would negotiate with third parties), 
with Roberts, 1990 WL 118356, at *6 (quoting a press release stating that the 
incumbent bidder would be paid a termination fee if the target receives an unsolicited 
offer and accepts the offer in accordance with the board’s fiduciary duties), and 
Braunschweiger, 1989 WL 128571, at *9 n.13 (quoting a press release stating that the 
incumbent bidder would be paid a termination fee if the target’s board withdraws its 
stockholder recommendation and accepts another offer in accordance with its fiduciary 
duties). But see BRC Holdings Inc., Press Release (Form SC 14D1, exhibit 9), at 1 (Oct. 
23, 1998) (filing a press release containing no indication, either explicit or implicit, that 
the company was willing to entertain offers from third parties). The BRC Holdings 
transaction became the subject of the litigation in Matador Capital Management, 729 
A.2d at 291. 
 114 See, e.g., In re MCA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 598 A.2d 687, 693 (Del. Ch. 1991) 
(no matching rights); In re Vitalink, 1991 WL238816, at *7, 10 (same); In re KDI, 1988 
WL 116448, at *3 (same). 
 115 787 A.2d 691, 705-07 (Del. Ch. 2001).  
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rely exclusively on a post-agreement market check.116 Unlike 
Fort Howard, Pennaco concerned a strategic transaction—not 
an LBO. In November 2000, Pennaco and a subsidiary of 
Marathon Oil entered into a confidentiality agreement after 
Marathon expressed an interest in acquiring Pennaco.117 After 
entering into the confidentiality agreement, Pennaco’s board 
focused solely on Marathon and did not attempt to canvass the 
market even though the confidentiality agreement did not 
prohibit Pennaco from doing so.118 A little over a month after 
entering into the confidentiality agreement, the parties 
executed a merger agreement.119 The merger agreement 
included a relatively non-restrictive no shop provision that 
allowed Pennaco to speak with and provide information to any 
third party who could reasonably “be expected to make a 
superior offer that could be consummated without undue 
delay.”120 In addition, Marathon was granted matching rights 
that allowed Marathon a three-day period during which it 
could match a superior proposal.121 The agreement also 
contained a termination fee equal to 3% of Pennaco’s equity 
  
 116 Id. at 692. 
 117 Id. at 698. 
 118 Id. at 699. Pennaco also did not hire an investment bank to canvass the 
market for it. Id. However, Pennaco’s management identified investment bankers for 
possible retention should a transaction arise with Marathon or another party, and 
Pennaco received pitch books from two of the banks that it contacted, including Credit 
Suisse First Boston (“CSFB”). Id. CSFB provided Pennaco with preliminary valuation 
analyses and indicated a range in value for Pennaco between $17.88 and $20.81 per 
share. Id.  
 119 Id. at 702. After completing three weeks of due diligence, Marathon 
submitted its initial bid of $17 per share. Id. at 700. The Pennaco board determined 
that Marathon’s bid was too low, given CSFB’s preliminary valuation, and instructed 
Pennaco’s CEO to reject the $17 offer and “to seek a price ‘north of $20 a share.’ ” Id. A 
week after its initial offer, Marathon increased its bid to $19 per share. Id. at 701. The 
board again met and instructed the CEO “to see if there was ‘any more room above the 
$19 a share.’” Id. At that meeting, the board also hired Lehman Brothers as its 
investment bank. Id. After Marathon indicated that $19 a share was its absolute best 
and final offer, the board authorized Lehman to begin working on a fairness opinion 
and discussed its fiduciary duties and possibilities for a post-agreement market check 
with its outside counsel. Id. Lehman gave an oral presentation to the board regarding 
its fairness opinion, during which it presented net asset valuations based on three 
different “base cases,” the most aggressive of which produced a range of value of $15.14 
to $18.89 per share. Id. at 702 (internal quotation marks omitted). Following its 
presentation, Lehman gave an oral opinion that Marathon’s $19 per share offer was 
fair and the board then formally approved a sale of Pennaco to Marathon at $19 per 
share. Id.  
 120 Id.  
 121 See Pennaco Energy, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form 8-K, 
exhibit 2.1), at 38-39 (Dec. 27, 2000), (filing Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of 
December 22, 2000, that included a three-business-day matching rights period in 
Section 8.01(d)).  
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value and slightly less than 3% of the value of its combined 
debt and equity as measured by the transaction value.122 
Furthermore, in order to allow sufficient time for third parties 
to review the transaction and make competing offers, the 
Pennaco board obtained an agreement from Marathon that it 
would not commence its tender offer until the second week of 
January 2001.123 
In addressing the Pennaco stockholders’ challenges that 
the Pennaco board breached their Revlon duties by solely 
negotiating with Marathon and by relying on a post-agreement 
market check with a termination fee, Vice Chancellor Strine 
first noted that “one would not commend the Pennaco board’s 
actions as a business school model of value maximization” 
before finding that the board’s actions were reasonable.124 
Strine validated the board’s single bidder strategy because the 
board ensured that a post-agreement market check would occur 
and because the termination fee and matching rights did not 
act as substantial barriers to third parties.125 Although he 
found the board’s actions to be reasonable, it is noteworthy that 
Vice Chancellor Strine indicated that had the board agreed to 
more onerous deal protection devices that prevented competing 
bids from emerging, his decision would likely have been 
different.126 
3. In re MONY Group Inc. Shareholder Litigation 
Three years after its decision in Pennaco, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery again addressed the necessity of a pre-
signing auction and the adequacy of a post-signing market 
check in In re MONY Group Inc. Shareholder Litigation.127 Like 
Pennaco, MONY also did not involve an LBO but rather a 
  
 122 In re Pennaco, 787 A.2d at 702, 702 n.16.  
 123 Id. at 703.  
 124 Id. at 705. In reaching the conclusion that the board’s actions were not 
unreasonable, Strine relied on numerous factors, including: (1) Pennaco’s market 
posture, including that the company was a “source of industry interest”; (2) Pennaco’s 
recent search for a joint venture partner that had “brought the company to the 
attention of twenty to thirty industry players”; (3) the company’s “reincorporation into 
Delaware to facilitate its participation in the mergers and acquisitions market”; and (4) 
the board members’ expertise and experience in the industry. Id. at 705-06.  
 125 Id. at 707 (holding that the fact that no higher bids emerged “is itself 
‘evidence that the directors, in fact, obtained the highest and best transaction 
reasonably available’” (quoting Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings, Inc., 
729 A.2d 280, 293 (Del. Ch. 1998)).  
 126 Id. at 707. 
 127 852 A.2d 9, 20-21, 23-24 (Del. Ch. 2004).  
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strategic transaction. In MONY, MONY Group Inc. 
stockholders challenged the proposed stock-for-cash merger of 
MONY and a wholly-owned subsidiary of AXA Financial, Inc.128 
After MONY posted losses in 2001 and 2002, the company’s 
board of directors authorized its CEO, Michael I. Roth, to 
explore strategic opportunities but rejected the idea of a public 
auction of the company.129 Approximately ten months after 
Roth first met with AXA, MONY and AXA announced they had 
signed a merger agreement pursuant to which MONY 
stockholders would receive $31 cash for each share of MONY 
stock.130 The merger agreement contained a window shop 
provision which prohibited MONY from actively soliciting offers 
during the five-month market check period but allowed the 
board to pursue proposals that were, or were reasonably likely 
to constitute, a more favorable business combination to 
stockholders and that was reasonably capable of being 
completed on the proposed terms.131 In addition, AXA was 
granted a five-day period during which it could match a 
superior proposal.132 The merger agreement also contained a 
termination fee of $50 million, which represented 3.3% of 
MONY’s total equity value and 2.4% of the total transaction 
value.133 The MONY stockholders challenged the board’s 
decision to forego a pre-signing auction or solicitation process 
and also challenged the adequacy of the post-signing market 
check.134 
In finding that the board’s decision not to pursue a pre-
agreement auction was reasonable, Vice Chancellor Lamb 
stated that “[s]ingle-bidder approaches offer the benefits of 
protecting against the risk that an auction will be a failed one, 
and avoiding a premature disclosure to the detriment of the 
  
 128 Id. at 14-15.  
 129 Id. at 16. In November 2002, the board met with its financial advisor, 
CSFB, to discuss MONY’s financial issues. Id. CSFB’s report to the board suggested 
twelve potential partners and acquirers for MONY, including AXA Financial. Id.  
 130 Id. at 18. This price represented a 7.3% premium over MONY’s then-
current trading price of $28.89. Id. 
 131 Id. at 23 n.31.  
 132 See The MONY Group Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form 8-K, 
exhibit 2.1), § 9.1(h), at 59-60 (Sept. 18, 2003) (filing Agreement and Plan of Merger, 
dated as of September 17, 2003, that included a five-business-day matching rights 
period).  
 133 In re MONY, 852 A.2d at 18.  
 134 Id. at 20, 23. 
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company’s then-ongoing business.”135 In addition, the court held 
that the five-month period between the merger agreement 
signing and the date on which the MONY stockholders brought 
suit was more than adequate for a competing bidder to emerge 
and complete due diligence.136 
Although the Court of Chancery continued to scrutinize 
the board’s activities in light of the totality of the 
circumstances, there were a number of facts that differentiated 
the more recent market checks validated in Pennaco and 
MONY from the first market check that the court upheld in 
Fort Howard.137 Unlike Fort Howard, neither Pennaco nor 
MONY issued a press release explicitly stating that the target’s 
management was available to field third party inquiries.138 In 
addition, some practitioners have noted that the termination 
fees upheld in both Pennaco and MONY were not only higher 
than the Fort Howard termination fee but were also 
significantly higher than termination fees contained in other 
deals involving post-signing market checks in the absence of a 
market canvass.139 Finally, unlike in Fort Howard, the initial 
bidders in both Pennaco and MONY received matching rights 
in the event of a superior third party proposal.140 A practitioner 
  
 135 Id. at 21. Vice Chancellor Lamb indicated that the MONY board considered 
several factors in deciding not to engage in an active solicitation process. Id. These 
factors included (1) the previous attempt by another company engaged in the same 
industry whose business and stock market performance suffered after undergoing a 
public auction; (2) the risk that MONY’s employees would seek alternative 
employment; (3) the risk that competitors would gain a competitive advantage after 
performing due diligence on MONY and would seek to employ MONY’s career agency 
force; and (4) the knowledge that a post-agreement market check was a possibility. Id.  
 136 Id. at 23-24. 
 137 See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (stating 
that a board’s actions “must be evaluated in light of relevant circumstances to 
determine if they were undertaken with due diligence and in good faith”).  
 138 Compare text at supra note 102 (quoting a Fort Howard press release that 
explicitly stated that management was available to field unsolicited third party offers) 
with Pennaco Energy, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 27, 2000) (press release 
that does not mention management’s availability to field unsolicited third party offers, 
nor does the press release mention the inclusion of a window shop provision in the 
merger agreement), and The MONY Group Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 18, 
2003) (same).  
 139 See Morton & Houtman, supra note 27, at 3-4 (noting that the Pennaco fee 
of 3% and the MONY fee of 3.3% were higher than the Fort Howard fee of 1.9% and 
were much higher than similar situations in the past involving a sale of control to a 
single bidder without a pre-signing market canvass).  
 140 See The MONY Group Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 59-60 (Sept. 18, 
2003) (filing Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of September 17, 2003, that 
included a five-business-day matching rights period in Section 9.1(h)); Pennaco Energy, 
Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 38-39 (Dec. 27, 2000) (filing Agreement and Plan of 
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at one Delaware law firm theorized that the differences 
between Pennaco, MONY and Fort Howard are a result of 
Pennaco and MONY involving strategic buyers while Fort 
Howard involved an MBO.141 In any event, some commentators 
believe that this liberalization of market checks paved the way 
for the recent prevalence of the go-shop provision.142  
D. 2004-2007: The Development of the Go-Shop 
Until recently, the window shop provision was the 
medium of choice for boards seeking to ensure the 
maximization of stockholder value in the absence of a public 
auction or targeted market canvass. Dealmakers rarely used 
go-shop provisions, and when they chose to use them it was 
generally only under special circumstances.143 Richard E. Spatt, 
a partner at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, has indicated 
that these “special circumstances” include situations “where an 
insider or fiduciary/board member is the buyer” or where the 
price terms of a deal have been renegotiated downward.144  
The Delaware Court of Chancery first addressed go-
shops in its 1989 opinion, In re Formica Corp. Shareholders 
Litigation.145 The go-shop provision in that case arose during 
the MBO of Formica Corp. and permitted the unlimited 
solicitation and negotiation of competing acquisition proposals 
during the thirty business day, or forty-seven calendar day, 
period that the tender offer was open.146 The deal, entered into 
after a very limited market canvass, included a $5 million 
termination fee representing approximately 2.14% of the equity 
value of the transaction and a provision capping expense 
  
Merger, dated as of December 22, 2000, that included a three-business-day matching 
rights period in Section 8.01(d)).  
 141 See Michael K. Reilly, The Post-Agreement Market Check Revisited (Mar. 
2004), available at http://www.potteranderson.com/news-publications-40-45.html 
(arguing that differences between the three cases are a result of Pennaco and MONY 
involving a strategic third party who may not be as familiar with the target and as a 
result incurring higher sunk costs).  
 142 See Morton & Houtman, supra note 27, at 5 (stating that following 
Pennaco and MONY post-signing market checks “began fading into the background 
and a new approach—the go-shop provision—started to take hold”); see also Spatt, 
supra note 13, at 33 (stating that go-shops are natural extensions of no shops). 
 143 See Spatt, supra note 13, at 33-40 (describing the rise of the go-shop 
provision).  
 144 Id.  
 145 CIV.A. No. 10598, 1989 WL 25812 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1989).  
 146 Id. at *8.  
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reimbursement at $5.5 million.147 The press release announcing 
the transaction explicitly stated that Formica’s financial 
advisor had been instructed to “actively solicit competing 
bids.”148  
The stockholders challenged the post-signing market 
test as being incapable of resulting in a meaningful auction, 
arguing that the length of the market test period was an 
insufficient time for incoming bidders to arrange complex 
foreign financing.149 However, then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs 
rejected this argument for several reasons. First, Jacobs noted 
that bidders do not require foreign financing unless they need 
debt financing and, even then, bidders could make their bids 
subject to securing financing and temporarily finance the 
acquisition using a bridge loan.150 Second, Jacobs stated that 
there was “no evidence that any potential bidder . . . 
complained that the . . . period [was] too truncated to enable a 
bid to be made.”151 Finally, Vice Chancellor Jacobs compared 
the go-shop provision to the no shop provision in Fort Howard 
and found the facts of Formica to be “more compelling” because 
the target could actively solicit potential bidders, the target’s 
financial advisor had contacted 125 potential bidders and was 
engaged in discussions with four of them, and “the market test 
period [was] one week longer than the one employed in Fort 
Howard.”152  
Following Formica in 1989, only a handful of deals over 
the subsequent decade and a half contained go-shops.153 This 
  
 147 In re Formica Corp. S’holders Litig., 1989 WL 25812, at *3-4, *8 
(describing the exploratory discussions and the terms of the final merger agreement). 
The special committee considered holding an auction but rejected the idea, fearing  
that it may not end up with any bids. Id. at *6.  
 148 Id. at *7.  
 149 Id. at *12.  
 150 Id.  
 151 Id.  
 152 Id. The tender offers in Formica and Fort Howard both remained open for 
thirty business days although the Formica tender offer was open for four calendar days 
longer than the Fort Howard tender offer. Compare In re Fort Howard S’holders Litig., 
Civ. A. No. 9991, 1988 WL 83147, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) (stating that the tender 
offer would remain open for thirty business days or forty-three calendar days) with In 
re Formica, 1989 WL 25812, at *8, *12 (stating that the tender offer would remain open 
for thirty business days or forty-seven calendar days and such time constituted the 
market check period).  
 153 See, e.g., Spatt, supra note 13, at 33 (indicating that the 1991 acquisition 
by non-executive chairman of National Gypsum included a go-shop provision); Kemper 
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2-3 (July 1, 1994) (summarizing a merger 
agreement allowing for a ten-day go-shop period with a bifurcated termination fee 
pursuant to which Kemper could terminate the agreement in favor of a third party).  
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scarce use of go-shops is likely a product of the collapse of the 
high-yield bond market and the resulting substantial decline in 
LBOs in 1989 and 1990.154 Then, beginning in 2004, dealmakers 
began including go-shops in a rising number of deals.155 During 
2006, dealmakers included go-shops in at least fifteen deals.156  
This sudden increased use of go-shops may lead one to 
ask: what has changed that dealmakers are turning to go-
shops? The answer to this question is likely the result of a 
combination of factors. As discussed in Part I, over the past 
three years, there has been a resurgence in the number of 
private equity firms entering the playing field.157 In contrast to 
transactions with strategic players, private equity firms often 
bring different considerations to the negotiating table. Private 
equity firms frequently deal with targets that have not 
necessarily considered themselves as being for sale.158 Private 
equity firms, like other buyers, prefer having private 
negotiations with the target company and thus often avoid 
competitive auctions, which frequently result in increasing the 
purchase price of the target.159 Accordingly, a private equity 
firm may make its proposal contingent on the target not 
shopping the deal prior to entering into a definitive 
agreement.160 However, in return for abstaining from shopping 
  
 154 See Steven N. Kaplan, The Evolution of U.S. Corporate Governance: We Are 
All Henry Kravis Now, J. PRIVATE EQUITY, Fall 1997, at 7, available at 
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/steven.kaplan/research/govern.pdf (discussing the decline 
of LBOs and the reasons for the decrease).  
 155 See, e.g., The Chalone Wine Group, Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 
1, 2004) (filing merger agreement with a go-shop provision and press release 
announcing Chalone may continue to solicit bids); Hollywood Entertainment Corp., 
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 14, 2004) (filing amended merger agreement with go-
shop provision and press release announcing that according to amended merger 
agreement that included a renegotiated price, Hollywood Entertainment was permitted 
to entertain competing proposals); US Oncology, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 
22, 2004) (filing merger agreement with a go-shop provision and press release 
announcing that US Oncology may continue to solicit competing bids).  
 156 See Morton & Houtman, supra note 27, at app. 7-18 (listing transactions 
that included go-shop provisions in their agreements).  
 157  See supra Part. I (discussing increase in private equity deals).  
 158 See Peters et al., supra note 69 (“[A] target board may be faced with a 
situation in which, although it has no intention to sell, it is approached by an 
unsolicited bidder who makes an offer that the board is compelled to consider.”). 
 159 See Thomas J. Dougherty, Takeovers, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: 
SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND STRATEGY 327, 330 (2007) (“[O]nce p-e [private 
equity] players commit to a potential deal, they would rather proceed from a bear hug 
offer that dazzles management through to deal closure with as little competitive 
bidding as possible.”). 
 160 See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 104 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(recognizing that the private equity buyer indicated that it would pull its bid if a “full-
blown auction” were conducted).  
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the deal pre-signing—and in recognition that the target board 
has an obligation to fulfill its Revlon duties—private equity 
firms will agree to go-shop provisions.161 Because the private 
equity firm has secured its place as the initial acquirer it is 
able to benefit from the other deal protection devices that the 
agreement often contains, including termination fees and 
matching rights. Furthermore, although the target is, in effect, 
conducting an auction post-signing, go-shop periods are not 
generally as long as public auctions.162 Therefore, the initial 
acquirer is able to avoid a pre-signing bidding war, secure an 
agreement and then the target is put on the auction block for a 
more limited period.  
In addition to the private equity buyers’ avoidance of 
public auctions, the target board may harbor concerns that a 
public auction or pre-signing market canvass will not be 
effective in inducing bids when a private equity firm has 
already made a proposal. Boards may fear that third parties 
will be hesitant to compete with a buyout group that includes 
target insiders, or that management may not cooperate with a 
public auction because it is already aligned with the private 
equity buyer.163 Furthermore, boards also may be concerned 
about the market for corporate control’s perception that the 
  
 161 See Michael Weisser & Michael Cubell, Go-Shops: Are Sponsors Giving 
Away the Store?, PRIVATE EQUITY ALERT (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP), Dec. 2006, at 
1, 3-4, http://www.weil.com/wgm/cwgmhomep.nsf/Files/PEADec06/$file/PEADec06.pdf 
(describing reasons that private equity buyers agree to go-shop provisions).  
 162 See Mills & Harsch, supra note 12, at 45 (recognizing the time differences 
required for public auctions and typical go-shop periods).  
 163 See Stephen I. Glover & Jonathan P. Goodman, Go-Shops: Are They Here to 
Stay?, M&A LAW., June 2007, at 1 (describing reasons boards may agree to go-shop 
provisions when a private equity firm has made a buyout proposal). This argument 
may have some weight, as Professor Guhan Subramanian, in an article summarizing 
an empirical study of go-shop provisions, states that: 
 
The fact that no higher bidder has emerged in an MBO go-shop to date 
(after nearly two years of experience with go-shops, in a frenzied deal 
environment) suggests that third parties may be wary of entering a 
bidding contest, or that bankers might not conduct as thorough and 
energetic a search, when management has already picked its preferred 
buyout partner. A management team with difficult-to-acquire firm-
specific skills and knowledge can use their inherent advantage to buy 
the company from the public shareholders at a lower price, by 
effectively committing to its favored buyout group and making clear its 
unwillingness to work with any other buyout group that might emerge 
during the go-shop process. 
 
Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops v. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and 
Implications (forthcoming BUS. LAWYER, May 2008).  
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board itself is favoring the private equity buyer.164 In the 
opinion of the board, the inclusion of a go-shop provision in the 
final agreement helps to mitigate the perception that the board 
or management may be biased in favor of the private equity 
buyer.165  
In addition to the increased role that private equity 
firms are playing in the M&A world and the related issues that 
LBOs and MBOs raise, stockholder activism also has been on 
the rise.166 Stockholders are increasingly willing to challenge 
deals that, in their opinion, do not maximize stockholder 
value.167 Although stockholder suits overall have decreased in 
recent years, suits challenging deals involving private equity 
firms have doubled over the past three years.168 As a result, 
boards are increasingly turning to go-shop provisions in an 
effort to show that they have and are continuing to fulfill their 
Revlon duties.169 
E. Typical Characteristics of Go-Shop Provisions 
As mentioned previously, go-shops allow the target 
company to actively solicit other bidders post-signing for a 
limited period, generally ranging from fifteen to fifty days.170 
Agreements containing go-shop provisions also typically 
contain deal protection devices such as termination fees and 
matching rights. Termination fees are often bifurcated; that is, 
  
 164 See Glover & Goodman, supra note 163. 
 165 See id. 
 166 See generally Battling for Corporate America—Shareholder Democracy, 
THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, at 63 (describing an environment of shareholder 
activism).  
 167 Christopher Palmeri, Saying No to an LBO, BUS. WEEK, July 23, 2007,  
at 26.  
 168 Id.; see also Wong, Rival Bidders, supra note 22 (stating that stockholders 
increasingly react with hostility toward private equity deals).  
 169 See Dan Freed, They’ve Shopped, But Haven’t Dropped: First-Half M&A 
Sizzled, and the Second Half Is Already Off to a Fast Start. Is It Too Much of a Good 
Thing?, INV. DEALERS’ DIG., July 9, 2007 (“The emergence of the ‘go shop’ appears to be 
symptomatic of a larger concern among boards that they be seen as doing whatever 
they can on behalf of shareholders.”); Glover & Goodman, supra note 163 (“Yet another 
factor explaining the rise of the go-shop is increased shareholder activism by 
institutional investors and hedge funds.”).  
 170 See Morton & Houtman, supra note 27 (providing a table listing 
transactions containing go-shop provisions, including details regarding the length of 
the go-shop periods). Typically, go-shop provisions do not limit who may be solicited 
during the go-shop period. Glover & Goodman, supra note 163. However, in a few deals 
targets have been limited to contacting a select group of strategic buyers or a limited 
number of bidders generally. Id. 
558 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2 
a lower termination fee will apply during the go-shop period 
than following the go-shop period. The lower termination fee 
generally ranges from 40% to 60% of the base termination 
fee.171 Some deals have allowed the lower termination fee to 
apply only if the target terminated the original agreement 
“prior to the expiration of the go-shop period,” while other deals 
permit the lower termination fee to apply so long as the target 
company terminated the original agreement in favor of a 
superior proposal that was received during the go-shop 
period.172 Go-shop provisions are also often paired with 
matching rights, allowing the initial acquirer an opportunity to 
match any bids received as a result of a target’s solicitation 
during the go-shop period.173 Finally, following the expiration of 
the go-shop period, target companies are subject to no shop and 
fiduciary out provisions.174 Therefore, following the expiration 
of the go-shop period, the target may no longer actively solicit 
bids. Although the target may consider superior proposals, the 
higher base termination fee would apply to bids received after 
the expiration of the go-shop period.175 
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF GO-SHOP PROVISIONS AND  
RECENT DELAWARE JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Intended Advantages and Related Criticisms of  
Go-Shop Provisions 
As the use of go-shop provisions increases, so has the 
attention that the provisions are receiving from the M&A 
community. Law firms have issued a number of client 
memoranda discussing and often questioning the efficacy of go-
shops.176 The rise of the go-shop has not been lost on the 
business press, which has also expressed skepticism regarding 
  
 171 See Glover & Goodman, supra note 163 (describing bifurcated termination 
fees).  
 172 See Kevin M. Schmidt, Private Equity: Current M&A Issues for Buyers, in 
EIGHTH ANNUAL PRIVATE EQUITY FORUM 99, 106, 110 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Series No. 1614, 2007) (summarizing transactions containing 
bifurcated termination fees).  
 173 See id. at 110 (describing recent transactions including go-shops and 
matching rights).  
 174 See id. at 105, 106. 
 175 See id. at 106, 110. 
 176 See, e.g., Paul Kingsley & Mutya Harsch, Go-Shop Provisions: A New 
Trend?, PRIVATE EQUITY NEWSL. (Davis Polk & Wardwell), Dec. 2006, at 1, available at 
http://www.dpw.com/1485409/dpw/12_07_06_PrivateEquityNews_dec_06.pdf; Morton & 
Houtman, supra note 27, at 6-7; Weisser & Cubell, supra note 161, at 4-5.  
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the benefits of go-shop provisions. In particular, commentators 
have debated the effectiveness of go-shop provisions in 
inducing third party bids and have questioned a board’s ability 
to adequately fulfill its Revlon duties by utilizing the 
provisions. This section seeks to summarize the purported 
advantages and related criticisms of go-shops.  
1. Effectiveness of Go-Shop Provisions in Inducing 
Third Party Offers  
One of the purported benefits of go-shop provisions is 
that they enable the target company to have a form of 
insurance in change of control transactions. In other words, go-
shop provisions allow the target to conduct an open auction, 
but because a signed deal already exists, the target avoids the 
risks involved with a potentially failed public auction.177 
However, a full-blown pre-signing auction and a post-signing 
auction are not created equal. In contrast to public auctions 
where all bidders are on equal footing, post-signing market 
checks, particularly those resulting from go-shop provisions, 
provide several advantages to the incumbent bidder. The 
foremost advantage is that the initial acquirer begins the 
auction in first place and, thus, gains the benefits derived from 
its first place position, including the traditional deal protection 
devices contained in the definitive merger agreement.178 
Therefore, critics argue that third party bidders are less likely 
to emerge post-signing because of the protections conferred 
upon the initial acquirer in the merger agreement.179 However, 
proponents contend that go-shop provisions may be more 
effective than traditional market checks because bidders are 
more likely to emerge post-signing if they are actively 
solicited.180 
  
 177 See Go-Shop, POCKET MBA (PLI), Aug. 8, 2007 (stating that go-shops 
provide targets with the benefits of an open auction without risk).  
 178 See Kingsley & Harsch, supra note 176 (stating that the initial acquirer is 
in an “enviable first place position as the preferred buyer”).  
 179 Id. at 7-8 (summarizing arguments that go-shop provisions do not induce 
third party bidders). 
 180 Id. at 6-7 (stating that some proponents contend that third parties are 
more likely to propose a bid post-signing if they are actively solicited to do so). In 
addition, commentators point out that, in contrast to the typical fiduciary out provision 
where companies have to wait for unsolicited superior proposals, “[g]reater 
transparency and openness is accomplished when the target is allowed to actively 
pursue other offers.” Block, supra note 23, at 108 (summarizing advantages and 
disadvantages of go-shop provisions). 
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Because go-shop provisions have traditionally been used 
in LBOs and MBOs, critics assert that there are additional 
reasons that the provisions are not successful in adequately 
maximizing stockholder value. Specifically, they argue that 
both private equity firms and strategic buyers may be hesitant 
in making a proposal when the initial acquirer is a private 
equity firm. In particular, some experts have suggested that 
private equity firms operate on an unwritten gentlemen’s 
agreement that they will not jump another private equity 
firm’s signed deal.181 That is, they act on a sort of “what goes 
around comes around” mentality, most likely because they tend 
to engage in several deals a year, and the possibility exists that 
they could see the same private equity firm on the next deal.182 
Vice Chancellor Strine referenced this mentality recently, 
stating that it is “a reality that there is not a culture of 
rampant topping among the larger private equity players, who 
have relationships with each other that might inhibit such 
behavior.”183 Nonetheless, in the aggressive world of M&A 
participants, it is hard to imagine that, given the right 
circumstances, a private equity group would not jump a deal 
for fear of future retribution, even if they consider it to be in 
bad form to do so.184 In fact, it already appears as if the market 
is heading in that direction. Recently, an affiliate of Apollo 
Management L.P., a private equity firm, successfully jumped 
  
 181 See Janet Morrissey, A Private Equity Peak?, TIME, July 19, 2007 (stating 
that the deal jumping among private equity firms is considered a faux pas and quoting 
Chris Young, Director of M&A Research at Institutional Shareholder Services, as 
saying, “It has long been suspected that there is an unwritten gentleman’s agreement 
among private-equity firms to refrain from jumping each other’s deals”); see also Freed, 
supra note 169 (noting that private equity firms have not outbid other private equity 
firms in the context of a go-shop provision). Rob Kindler, Vice Chairman of M&A at 
Morgan Stanley, has stated, “If boards are told go shops’ [sic] are likely to make other 
private equity firms outbid a signed private equity deal, they’re being misinformed.” Id.  
 182 See Glover & Goodman, supra note 163 (stating that private equity firms 
may be reluctant to jump a signed deal when they may see the other private equity 
buyer in the next deal). The same sort of unspoken or unwritten gentlemen’s 
agreement does not appear to exist among strategic players in today’s M&A 
environment. Even the Court of Chancery has recognized that “strategic buyers have 
not felt shy about ‘jumping’ friendly deals crafted between their industry rivals.” In re 
Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1008 (Del. Ch. 2005). This is likely 
because strategic buyers are not engaging in the same number of transactions as 
private equity firms.  
 183 In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 121 (Del. Ch. 2007).  
 184 Vice Chancellor Strine also has expressed doubt as to whether “such a 
culture . . . can persist given the powerful countervailing economic incentives at  
work.” Id.  
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an MBO of EGL, Inc., a global freight transportation 
provider.185  
Like private equity buyers, strategic buyers may also be 
hesitant in jumping a signed LBO or MBO. In particular, 
critics argue that strategic buyers may decide not to jump  
deals where the target company’s management is already 
aligned with the private equity buyer who is planning to retain 
management and who may be offering management additional 
equity stakes following completion of the proposed 
transaction.186 Therefore, a strategic buyer may harbor 
concerns that it will not have enough time to assemble a 
different management team or that its offer would not be 
successful because it is not willing to offer management the 
same potential benefits.187  
Others simply contend that go-shop provisions are 
unnecessary, pointing out that because of the media scrutiny 
that going-private transactions receive, potential strategic and 
financial buyers are fully aware that the target company is “in 
play.”188 As a result, there is no need for the target company to 
actively solicit bids post-signing and the boards can simply rely 
on the traditional window shop provision.189  
Still others point out that go-shop provisions make the 
incumbent bidder a stalking horse for its own transaction 
which they argue actually makes the target company more 
desirable to third parties.190 In addition, the target company is 
  
 185 See EGL, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), May 24, 2007 (describing EGL’s 
termination of a merger agreement with a CEO-led group and entry into a merger 
agreement with an Apollo Management affiliate after EGL determined that the Apollo 
affiliate’s offer constituted a superior proposal).  
 186 See Glover & Goodman, supra note 163; see also In re Netsmart Tech., Inc. 
S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 198 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[S]trategic buyers might sense that 
CEOs are more interested in doing private equity deals that leave them as CEOs than 
strategic deals that may . . . not.”). Vice Chancellor Strine has indicated that in 
deciding whether to submit a bid, strategic buyers consider the profits that 
management is likely to obtain in a proposed deal. See id.  
 187 See Glover & Goodman, supra note 163.  
 188 See Weisser & Cubell, supra note 161, at 3-4 (describing factors that initial 
acquirers weigh before agreeing to go-shop provisions); Michael Weisser & Matthew 
Cammack, Shepherding the Deal, THE DEAL, Mar. 30, 2007 (“[M]any question the 
practical need of go-shop provisions, particularly when private equity deals grab 
headlines and pricing and other material terms are often spelled out on the front pages 
of financial and other publications, thus drawing competing bids with little or no 
solicitation by the target.”).  
 189 See Weisser & Cubell, supra note 161, at 3-4; Weisser & Cammack, supra 
note 188 (stating that because of the extensive publicity most private equity deals 
have, competing bids are obtained with “little or no solicitation by the target”).  
 190 See Kingsley & Harsch, supra note 176 (describing the role the initial 
acquirer assumes as a “stalking horse”).  
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able to lock in a sale price. That is, the initial acquirer’s bid 
sets the floor for any third party bids.191 However, incoming 
third party bidders still must determine whether to submit a 
bid while taking into account the value of the underlying 
transaction and the related deal protection devices in the 
signed agreement. Thus, to have an opportunity to be a 
successful bidder post-signing, the third party’s bid must at 
least meet the initial acquirer’s bid plus an additional amount 
taking into account the termination fee for the transaction.192  
Proponents of go-shops argue that the provisions may 
actually aid the target in achieving maximum stockholder 
value. They reason that once the initial acquirer agrees to  
the inclusion of a go-shop provision, the initial acquirer is 
incentivized to offer the highest possible price in order to avoid 
a post-signing bidding war and the possibility that the deal 
may be successfully “jumped.”193  
2. Sufficiency of the Go-Shop Period in Preparing 
Superior Proposals and Other Timing  
Considerations Relating to Go-Shops  
Commentators also consider the ramifications of the go-
shop period. For instance, some question whether a third party 
has the legitimate opportunity to prepare a competitive 
superior proposal during the limited go-shop period. For 
example, a bid that is higher than the proposed transaction but 
is contingent on “obtaining financing” would likely not be 
deemed a superior proposal to a fully financed pre-existing 
LBO.194 However, the typically limited duration of the go-shop 
period may not provide a third party with sufficient time to 
secure financing.195 Furthermore, there is a risk that financing 
may not be available because the initial acquirer has already 
  
 191 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Looking for More Money, After Reaching a Deal, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, at 34 (stating that initial acquirer acts as a “stalking horse” 
and sets the base price for potential bidders).  
 192 For a further discussion of how termination fees work in practice, see 
supra Part II.A.3.  
 193 See Glover & Goodman, supra note 163 (arguing that a small number of 
topping bids may be due to an initial acquirer’s incentive to pay full price fearing that 
the deal may be lost during a go-shop period).  
 194 See Dougherty, supra note 159, at 331 (“[I]f such competitors overbid 
‘subject to obtaining financing,’ they run the risk that their premium priced bid will be 
deemed ‘not-superior’ to the fully financed p-e bird in the hand.”). 
 195 See id. at 330 (stating that the typical go-shop period may not provide a 
buyer with enough time to arrange financing).  
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taken advantage of the existing financing opportunities or has 
engaged the limited number of banks that can offer such a 
financing package to the point where the banks are conflicted 
from working with another buyer.196 Thus, in such a situation, 
the go-shop provision will not result in a superior proposal.  
In addition, the professed timing benefits of go-shop 
provisions may not be that great. Go-shop provisions 
purportedly allow parties to streamline the purchase process by 
permitting parties to forego a public auction or pre-signing 
market canvass. Instead, the parties can first enter into a 
definitive agreement and then the target company can begin 
the auction process while also working to satisfy the closing 
conditions with the initial acquirer.197 However, critics point out 
that go-shops force the target’s management to balance its time 
between the post-signing auction and the fulfillment of closing 
conditions, including the time-consuming tasks of proxy 
preparation and other filing preparations.198 As a result, 
although time may be saved on the front-end, critics contend 
that the period between signing and closing may be longer than 
in traditional post-signing market check situations.199 
Another timing consideration is that by quickly entering 
into a deal that includes a go-shop provision, the initial 
acquirer may immediately begin taking steps towards closing, 
including preparing regulatory filings and advancing the 
stockholder approval process.200 Thus, the initial acquirer is 
able to place itself in a position to be able to close the proposed 
transaction faster than a third party that enters post-signing.201 
As a result, go-shop provisions may have the unintended 
impact of making the target’s management and board favor the 
initial acquirer over a third party because the initial acquirer is 
in a more competitive position to close the transaction. 
  
 196 See id. (“[A] financed competitive bid assumes that financing has not been 
‘dried up’ in advance by a p-e bidder team that strategically pre-shopped financing 
opportunities to the market’s main financing sources but not the bid itself.”).  
 197 Schmidt, supra note 172, at 107 (describing purported timing advantages 
of go-shops).  
 198 See id.  
 199 Id.  
 200 See Mills & Harsch, supra note 12, at 46 (describing possible time benefits 
for the initial acquirer).  
 201 See id.  
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3. Effectiveness of Go-Shop Provisions in Reducing 
Stockholder Litigation 
As previously discussed, boards are turning to go-shop 
provisions in an effort to avoid increasingly active stockholders 
challenging proposed transactions and specifically challenging 
whether the boards have fulfilled their Revlon duties. Some 
commentators argue that the provisions allow boards to more 
easily fulfill their fiduciary duties because they remain open to 
higher offers.202 However, other commentators argue that the 
provisions are illusory and that the provisions are simply 
“window dressing,” the inclusion of which allows boards to 
argue that they have fulfilled their duty to maximize 
stockholder value although the boards may not be making 
additional efforts to do so.203 It appears that go-shop provisions 
will not shield boards from stockholder suits as two recent 
Delaware Court of Chancery cases demonstrate: in both cases 
the stockholders challenged the adequacy of the market check 
when the boards relied on the inclusion of go-shop provisions.  
B. Recent Delaware Court of Chancery Decisions Allowing 
Companies to “Shop Like Paris Hilton”204 During 
Extended Store Hours 
Despite expressing skepticism regarding the value of go-
shop provisions less than three months earlier at the Tulane 
Corporate Law Institute, Vice Chancellor Strine issued two 
back-to-back opinions that, like then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs’ 
decision nineteen years earlier in Formica, seemingly blessed 
the use of go-shop provisions as a technique for maximizing 
stockholder value.205 
1. In re Topps Co. Shareholders Litigation 
The first, In re Topps Co. Shareholders Litigation, 
involved the Michael Eisner-led private equity buyout of Topps 
  
 202 See Block, supra note 23, at 108 (detailing arguments in favor of go-shops).  
 203 See id. at 108-09 (describing criticisms of go-shop provisions).  
 204 In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 86 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 205 See David Marcus, The New Auction Rules, DAILY DEAL, Apr. 16, 2007 
(stating that Vice Chancellor Strine recognizes that go-shops “rarely produce much of 
anything for anyone, including shareholders”); David Marcus, Auctions, Conflicts and 
Go-shops, Oh My!, DAILY DEAL, Apr. 20, 2007 (recounting the highlights of the 2007 
Tulane Corporate Law Institute conference and describing Vice Chancellor’s Strine’s 
statements regarding go-shops provisions). 
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Co., a manufacturer of baseball cards and the distributor of 
Bazooka gum.206 Although the deal was not technically an 
MBO, the Eisner proposal ensured the retention of the majority 
of the company’s key employees and senior management, 
including the CEO and Chairman’s son-in-law who served as 
the company’s President and Chief Operating Officer.207 Topps’s 
ten-member board included three directors nominated by an 
insurgent stockholder whom Strine referred to as the 
“Dissident Directors” because the three directors did not agree 
with the “Incumbent Directors” on many issues, including the 
Eisner proposal.208  
Under Eisner’s proposal, a pre-signing auction or 
market check was not acceptable although Eisner was willing 
to accept a go-shop provision.209 As a result, the merger 
agreement included a provision that “gave Topps the chance to 
shop the bid for 40 days after signing, and the right to accept a 
‘Superior Proposal’ after that, subject only to Eisner’s receipt of 
a termination fee and his match right.”210 The agreement also 
included a bifurcated termination fee that amounted to 3.0% of 
the transaction value during the go-shop period and 4.6% of the 
transaction value after the go-shop period.211 
The board formed an executive committee, which 
consisted solely of the five Incumbent Directors, to evaluate 
offers during the go-shop period.212 The only responsibility the 
entire board, including the Dissident Directors, had with 
respect to the go-shop period was to evaluate whether a 
competing offer was actually a superior proposal or was likely 
to become one.213 At the beginning of the go-shop period, 
Topps’s financial advisor “contacted 107 potential strategic and 
financial bidders, [of which] five expressed interest in Topps 
  
 206 In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 60-61 (describing Topps’s business and the merger 
agreement between Eisner and Topps).  
 207 Id. at 60, 61, 73-74. This is of particular consequence because Topps had 
previously been the subject of a proxy contest designed to remove three directors, 
including CEO and Chairman, Arthur Shorin, who was also the grandson and nephew 
of the company’s founders. Id. at 60-61, 68. In fact, Eisner first approached Shorin 
during the proxy contest. Id. at 61, 68.  
 208 Id. at 61. The board approved the Eisner merger 7-3, with the Dissident 
Directors making up the three dissenting votes. Id. at 71.  
 209 Id. at 61, 70. 
 210 Id. at 61.  
 211 Id. at 66.  
 212 Id. at 71. The board formed the executive committee after the majority of 
the board determined that the Dissident Directors could not sufficiently represent the 
company’s interests because they had voted against the Eisner merger. Id.  
 213 Id.  
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and began a due diligence review.”214 The only bidder that 
seriously continued to pursue Topps was Upper Deck—the one 
true competitor of Topps—who submitted a bid two days before 
the expiration of the go-shop period.215 The Topps board met 
after the go-shop period expired and determined that Upper 
Deck was not an “Excluded Party” under the terms of the 
agreement, which would have allowed Upper Deck and Topps 
to continue talks past the expiration of the go-shop period.216 
The Topps board based its decision on concerns regarding 
Upper Deck’s ability to finance the transaction, the risk that 
the transaction may be delayed or prevented by antitrust 
authorities, and Upper Deck’s failure to sufficiently assume the 
antitrust risk and the small reverse termination fee proposed 
by Upper Deck.217 Following the board’s decision, Upper Deck 
made a new, unsolicited offer that was accompanied by a letter 
from Upper Deck’s financial advisor and potential lender 
stating that it was “highly confident” that it could finance the 
transaction.218 Upper Deck’s new proposal also offered to divest 
key licenses if required to do so by antitrust regulators and also 
was accompanied by an antitrust expert’s letter addressing 
Topps’s unspecified antitrust concerns.219 The Topps board 
determined that the unsolicited offer was not a superior 
proposal for similar reasons.220 The board also rejected Upper 
Deck’s request to be released from the standstill agreement 
that prevented Upper Deck from making public any 
information about its discussions with Topps and also 
prevented Upper Deck from launching a tender offer for Topps 
shares without the Topps board’s permission.221  
  
 214 In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 71. 
 215 Id. The Upper Deck bid was for $10.75 cash per share, $1 more per share 
than the Eisner proposal. Id. Upper Deck’s proposed merger agreement was based on 
the Eisner merger agreement but deleted all representations and warranties relating 
to Upper Deck’s ability to finance the merger, deleted a covenant requiring Upper Deck 
to divest assets in order to obtain regulatory and antitrust approvals, and included an 
affirmative right not to be required to divest assets in order to obtain regulatory 
approval. Id. In addition, Upper Deck included a “due diligence out” provision pursuant 
to which Topps would have to provide Upper Deck with any additional information that 
Upper Deck requested and that conditioned the transaction on Upper Deck’s 
satisfactory review of due diligence. Id.  
 216 Id. at 72. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. at 90. 
 220 Id. at 72-73.  
 221 Id. at 62.  
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Although Vice Chancellor Strine granted Upper Deck’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction, Topps “won” with respect 
to the deal protection devices, including the go-shop provision, 
which Strine found to be reasonable.222 Despite his earlier 
questioning of go-shops,223 Strine did not acknowledge that the 
Delaware courts had not addressed these provisions in recent 
years, nor did he cite to Formica in upholding the go-shop 
provision. Instead, Strine appeared to treat the go-shop 
provision as if it were a Fort Howard post-signing market 
check and stated that because the board had not performed a 
pre-signing market check, it properly obtained a go-shop 
provision.224  
Strine indicated that go-shops may be useful in inducing 
other bids because the existence of a “credible, committed” 
initial acquirer may act as a form of “sucker’s insurance” for 
others to take the leap and submit a bid.225 Thus, Strine 
adopted the argument urged by proponents of go-shops that the 
provisions foster positive psychological effects in helping to 
stimulate bids.226 In addition, Vice Chancellor Strine stated 
that although Eisner had been granted a matching right, the 
right was not a barrier to other bidders because matching 
rights have been overcome in the past.227 Strine also recognized 
that although a target might want a longer go-shop period or a 
lower break-up fee, the deal protection devices “left reasonable 
room for an effective post-signing market check. For 40 days, 
the Topps board could shop like Paris Hilton.”228  
Although Strine did not scrutinize the board’s reliance 
on a go-shop provision, he looked at the board’s actions during 
the go-shop period more closely. Strine found that the board’s 
  
 222 Id. at 86-87, 93.  
 223 See supra note 205 and accompanying text (describing Strine’s questioning 
of go-shop provisions).   
 224 In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 86.  
 225 Id. at 87.  
 226 Id.  
 227 Id. at 86.  
 228 Id. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, after the expiration of the go-
shop period, Topps could no longer talk to bidders “unless the bidder had already 
submitted a ‘Superior Proposal’ or the Topps board determined that the bidder was an 
‘Excluded Party’” (i.e., a party that the board determined was “reasonably likely to 
make a Superior Proposal”). Id. at 65. Topps could also consider bids after the forty-day 
period, if the bid was a superior proposal or was “reasonably likely to lead to one.” Id. 
Strine also found that if a bidder felt as if it needed more time, it could obtain the 
information it needed during the go-shop period and then submit an offer after the 
period expired and resume the process. Id. at 86-87. Thus, Strine seemed to imply that 
the two periods worked in tandem to create a longer go-shop period. See id.  
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decision not to treat Upper Deck as an “Excluded Party” so that 
it could negotiate further with Upper Deck after the go-shop 
period was “highly questionable” and suggested that the 
Incumbent Directors favored Eisner who promised to retain 
management.229 Strine further criticized Topps’s lack of a good 
faith effort to negotiate with Upper Deck and Topps’s mis-
representation of facts regarding Upper Deck’s offer that were 
included in Topps’s public disclosure, including public criticism 
of Upper Deck’s offer.230 Furthermore, Strine determined that 
Topps’s refusal to release Upper Deck from the standstill 
threatened Topps’s stockholders’ informed decision-making 
because Upper Deck was unable to tell its own version of the 
story.231 As a result, Strine granted a preliminary injunction 
delaying the merger vote until Topps granted Upper Deck a 
waiver of the standstill so that that Upper Deck could make a 
tender offer and communicate with Topps stockholders.232  
2. In re Lear Corp. Shareholders Litigation 
A day after Topps, Vice Chancellor Strine issued a 
second opinion, In re Lear Corp. Shareholders Litigation, in 
which the Vice Chancellor again issued a preliminary 
injunction delaying the merger vote until additional disclosure 
could be made, but blessed the parties’ inclusion of a go-shop 
provision in the merger agreement.233 That case stemmed  
from a Carl Icahn-led LBO of Lear Corp., a troubled company 
in which Icahn had obtained a 24% holding in 2006.234 In 
November 2006, concerned about his personal financial 
security, Lear’s long-time CEO, Robert E. Rossiter, approached 
Lear’s compensation committee about accelerating his retire-
ment benefit payments which had a fully vested value of $14.6 
million.235 The compensation committee hired a compensation 
  
 229 In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 89-90. Strine also emphasized that when Upper 
Deck proposed a materially higher price than the Eisner proposal, the board seemed 
“more bent on coming up with obstacles to securing that higher value” rather than 
reacting with enthusiasm at the possibility of enhancing stockholder value. Id. at 88.  
 230 Id. at 91. 
 231 Id. at 92. 
 232 Id. at 92-93. 
 233 In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 97-98 (Del. Ch. 2007).  
 234 Id. at 97, 100. Icahn planned to use an affiliated entity, American Real 
Estate Partner, LP, to consummate the transaction. Id. at 102.  
 235 Id. at 100. The retirement benefits would vest in 2011 when Rossiter 
turned 65; however, Rossiter could access $10.4 million of his SERP benefits by mid-
2007 if Rossiter retired. Id.  
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consulting firm that “presented five potential options to allow 
Rossiter to liquidate his retirement assets quickly while 
keeping his job.”236 The consulting firm indicated that no matter 
which option Rossiter were to choose, he was likely to face 
criticism from investors for accelerating his own benefits 
during a difficult period for the company.237 Rossiter, however, 
did not have to choose among the five options because, in 
January 2007, Icahn proposed a going-private transaction in 
which existing management would be retained.238 The special 
committee that was formed following Icahn’s proposal allowed 
Rossiter to negotiate price terms without the presence of Lear’s 
financial advisor or the special committee.239  
The Lear board debated whether the company should 
engage in a formal auction but ultimately rejected the idea 
fearing that it would disrupt business and that, more 
importantly, Icahn may pull his offer as Icahn had indicated 
that he would do if the company engaged in a full-blown 
auction.240 The board instead directed Lear’s financial advisor 
to engage in a four-day limited pre-signing canvass by 
contacting eight financial buyers who had an interest in the 
automotive sector, the industry in which Lear engages.241 Five 
of the financial buyers who were contacted expressed “tepid 
‘maybes,’” but none made a preliminary proposal or expressed 
a desire to pursue due diligence.242 A few days after the limited 
market canvass, Lear entered into a merger agreement with 
Icahn that included a forty-five day go-shop provision and 
fiduciary out that allowed Lear to accept a superior proposal 
following the expiration of the go-shop period.243 In addition, the 
agreement contained a bifurcated termination fee amounting to 
2.79% of the equity value of the deal if the agreement was 
terminated during the go-shop period, or 3.52% of the deal 
equity value if the agreement was terminated following the 
expiration of the go-shop period.244 Icahn also was granted 
  
 236 Id. at 100-01.  
 237 Id. at 101. 
 238 Id.  
 239 Id. at 102-03. 
 240 Id. at 104.  
 241 Id. at 104-05. 
 242 Id. at 105. 
 243 Id. at 105, 107.  
 244 Id. at 107. The agreement also provided that a termination fee was payable 
if the Lear board withdrew its recommendation for the merger or failed to reconfirm its 
support for the merger if it were requested to do so. Id.  
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matching rights which allowed Icahn ten days to determine 
whether to increase his offer to match a superior proposal.245 
Lear’s financial advisors began to contact potential buyers as 
soon as the merger agreement was executed.246 They contacted 
a total of forty-one potential buyers, twenty-four financial 
sponsors and seventeen strategic buyers, of which only eight 
buyers entered into confidentiality agreements to begin due 
diligence.247 However, unlike in Topps, none of the buyers 
contacted ultimately made a preliminary bid nor did Lear 
receive any unsolicited bids during the go-shop period.248 
Lear stockholders sought a preliminary injunction 
arguing that the Lear board did not disclose all material facts 
necessary for the stockholders to decide whether to approve the 
merger and that the Lear board failed to make a reasonable 
effort to maximize stockholder value.249 With respect to the 
Revlon claims, Strine stated that Rossiter should have 
informed the board of Icahn’s proposal earlier and that the 
special committee should have taken a larger role in the 
negotiation process, particularly in light of Rossiter’s personal 
interests in the going-private transaction.250 However, Strine 
concluded that the overall approach taken by the special 
committee appeared to have been reasonable.251 In finding that 
the Lear board’s decision not to engage in a full public auction 
was reasonable, Strine indicated that Lear’s elimination of its 
poison pill and Icahn’s investment in Lear were signals to the 
market that it was “perfectly obvious that Lear was open to 
invitations.”252 
Vice Chancellor Strine likewise rejected the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the go-shop provision combined with the other 
deal protection devices had the effect of chilling bids.253 
However, in reaching that determination, Strine admittedly 
  
 245 In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 108. Icahn’s offer was for $36 per share. Id. at 105. 
If the superior proposal was greater than $37 per share, Icahn only had one chance to 
match. Id. at 108. However, if the superior proposal was not greater than $37 per 
share, Lear had to give Icahn “three days to match each successive [superior] proposal.” 
Id. If Icahn decided not to match a superior proposal, Icahn agreed to vote his block of 
shares in favor of the superior proposal. Id.  
 246 Id. at 105.  
 247 Id. at 106. 
 248 Id. at 106-07. 
 249 Id. at 109-10.  
 250 Id. at 118.  
 251 Id.  
 252 Id. at 118-19. 
 253 Id. at 120.  
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gave the bifurcated, or two-tiered, termination fee “relatively 
little weight.”254 Strine acknowledged that most bidders would 
have been able to take advantage of the lower termination fee 
offered during the go-shop provision because it required the 
third party to “get the whole shebang done within the 45-day 
window.”255 Strine found that the 3.52% termination fee was 
reasonable because it was not of the level that would deter a 
serious bid.256 Strine treated Icahn’s matching rights similarly 
stating that matching rights “are hardly novel” and have been 
upheld even when coupled with termination fees.257  
Like his decision in Topps, Vice Chancellor Strine 
treated the Lear plaintiffs’ disclosure claims with skepticism.258 
Although Strine was careful to say that Rossiter did not act 
inappropriately, Strine found that Rossiter’s personal 
motivations for favoring a going-private transaction should 
have been included in the proxy statement.259 
3. Impact of Topps and Lear 
Although Strine continually stresses that Court of 
Chancery decisions are not intended to create bright-line rules 
  
 254 Id. at 119. 
 255 Id. at 119-20. To take advantage of the lower termination fee, Strine stated 
that the third party would have to  
do adequate due diligence, present a topping bid with a full-blown draft 
merger agreement, have the Lear board make the required decision to 
declare the new bid a superior offer, wait Icahn’s ten-day period to match, 
and then have the Lear board accept that bid, terminate its agreement with 
Icahn, and “substantially concurrently” enter into a merger agreement with 
it. All of these events had to occur within [the forty-five-day go-shop 
provision] . . . .  
Id. at 119. 
 256 Id. at 120. 
 257 Id. In reaching this conclusion, Strine relied on the defendants’ citation of 
over fifteen transactions that were jumped despite a termination fee exceeding 3% 
paired with matching rights. Id. at 120 n.21; see also The AREP Defendants’ 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Application for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 28-29, In re Lear, 926 A.2d 94, 2007 WL 2125317. The majority of the 
deals cited by defendants involved traditional no shop and window shop provisions 
rather than go-shop provisions. Affidavit of Daniel R. Fischel, exhibit O, In re Lear, 926 
A.2d 94, 2007 WL 2801493.  
 258 In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 114-15.  
 259 Id. at 114. On July 16, 2007, Lear’s stockholders voted against the Icahn 
buyout. See Lear Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K, exhibit 99.1) (July 17, 2007) (filing 
press release announcing that Lear stockholders had voted against the Icahn merger). 
This stockholder vote represents only the eighth U.S. deal (out of more than 1000 U.S. 
deals requiring consent) that stockholders have voted against since 2003. See Terry 
Kosdrosky, Lear Vote Is Big Bet on Detroit, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2007, at A2.  
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that dealmakers must follow in every deal, Strine’s cursory 
review of the go-shop provisions in Topps and Lear send a 
signal to dealmakers that go-shops are acceptable provisions to 
depend upon in future transactions.260 However, as the next 
section details, the effect of go-shop provisions is likely not that 
different than that of traditional post-signing market checks 
with respect to value maximization. In fact, both sale methods 
reveal that the Delaware courts are moving in the opposite 
direction from the purer bidding process announced in Revlon.  
IV. SHOPPING DURING “EXTENDED STORE HOURS”: NOT SO 
DIFFERENT FROM NOT SHOPPING AFTER ALL 
Although commentators have noted Strine’s cursory 
review of the go-shop provisions in Topps and Lear, they have 
failed to recognize Strine’s implicit recognition that we have 
come full circle since the 1980s when the Delaware Supreme 
Court announced that the board should act as auctioneers in 
sale of control transactions. Neither in Formica, nor in Lear 
and Topps, did either vice-chancellor draw a distinction 
between go-shop provisions and the post-signing market checks 
blessed in the Fort Howard line of cases that relied on deal 
protection devices, such as no shop and window shop 
provisions.261 I contend that this was not simply an oversight on 
the part of the Delaware Court of Chancery. Instead, it reflects 
the simple acknowledgment that despite all of the hoopla 
surrounding the recent prevalence of go-shop provisions, and 
the questioning of their effectiveness, the end result of the go-
  
 260 See Sheri Qualters, Strine Theory, NAT’L L.J., July 30, 2007, at 1 
(summarizing Vice Chancellor Strine’s opinion that deal tactics must change as 
companies’ circumstances change). Strine’s cursory review and failure to differentiate 
go-shops from no shops may well be a result of the lag time that frequently occurs 
between the use of a particular deal mechanism and the courts’ opportunity to review 
the mechanism. Because of the dynamic nature of M&A and the fact that dealmakers 
are often utilizing new deal tactics and new twists on transaction structures before 
they are blessed by the courts, many deals close prior to the courts having an 
opportunity to review the actions of dealmakers. In a similar context, Professor 
Edward R. Rock has commented that as a result of this lag time, Delaware courts are 
placed in the position of not being able to deem the dealmakers’ tactics or new 
transaction structures per se illegal. Rock, supra note 7, at 1096-97 (theorizing that 
because of the significant number of MBOs in the 1970s and 1980s, by the time the 
Delaware Court of Chancery could have an “opportunity to articulate standards,” the 
court could not find MBOs per se illegal). Beyond finding a particular deal tactic per se 
illegal, Delaware courts are presented with the situation where the actions or tactics 
used in a deal are not necessarily ideal but the courts may be hesitant to issue an 
injunction without a great showing of unreasonableness. 
 261  For a discussion of the Fort Howard line of cases, see Part II.C. 
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shop provision is the same as the post-signing market check 
with respect to value maximization. 
As described previously, a no shop provision with a 
fiduciary out, or a window shop provision, does not allow the 
active solicitation of third party offers. However, a no shop 
accompanied by a fiduciary out permits a target board to 
participate in negotiations with a third party who submits an 
unsolicited offer that is, or may become, a superior proposal. In 
contrast, the go-shop provision allows the active solicitation of 
such offers and effectively moves the auction process to the 
post-signing. However, these facial dissimilarities are where 
the differences between the two sale methods end.  
Targets have relied exclusively on both the post-signing 
market check and go-shop provisions in situations where they 
have negotiated solely with one bidder pre-signing, or 
conducted only a limited pre-signing market canvass, as in Fort 
Howard, Pennaco, MONY, Lear, and Topps. According to one 
survey, which analyzed thirty transactions including go-shop 
provisions, the target companies in nearly every transaction 
surveyed did not first conduct a pre-signing market canvass 
prior to entering into the merger agreement.262 Similarly, 
Delaware courts have upheld post-signing market checks when 
the target did not first conduct a pre-signing market canvass.263 
Thus, the same criticisms regarding the favoritism of boards 
and management and resulting bid chilling effects of go-shop 
provisions can be equally applied to post-signing market 
checks. For example, the possibility remains that using go-shop 
provisions to fulfill a board’s Revlon duties could “permit 
management to insulate its last period decisions from the 
constraint of the market for corporate control.”264 There is a risk 
that management and boards who may have ulterior motives 
could use go-shop provisions to go with the suitor of their 
choice rather than the bidder who may present a superior offer. 
Stated differently, go-shop provisions present the danger of 
allowing a board to “hide” behind a go-shop despite not having 
shopped the company pre-signing. However, the same risks 
exist in the now standard post-signing market check situation, 
  
 262 See Morton & Houtman, supra note 27, at 1 n.1 (describing results of 
survey).  
 263 See, e.g., In re MCA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 598 A.2d 687, 693 (Del. Ch. 1991) 
(upholding reliance on post-signing market check after initial merger agreement was 
publicly negotiated for two months and no other bidders came forward).  
 264 Griffith, supra note 40, at 1963.  
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and the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed such 
allegations of favoritism in Fort Howard.265 
Moreover, critics’ arguments that go-shops are 
ineffective at inducing superior proposals because of barriers to 
entry that a signed transaction present also hold true in 
situations where the target relies only on a post-signing market 
check. Like third parties who are contacted during a go-shop 
period, third parties that enter during a post-signing market 
check also encounter deal protection devices like termination 
fees and matching rights and also are constrained by the pre-
closing period. The Delaware courts, however, address only 
whether these mechanisms are too onerous that they would 
completely prevent bidders from “jumping” in post-signing. 
In fact, as we have seen, the continuing trend in the 
Delaware courts is to consider the sale process as a whole and, 
in particular, the reasonableness of the board’s decisions in 
light of the totality of the circumstances. As the Delaware 
courts have done since the 1980s, Lear and Topps demonstrate 
the courts’ continued focus on the role of management in 
negotiations. For example, the courts scrutinize whether there 
were conflicts of interest present and whether the 
management’s decisions were motivated by entrenchment.266 
Although the Delaware courts may express skepticism and 
suspicion regarding a board’s or special committee’s actions, 
the courts are, in effect, powerless to prevent such an action 
without a very persuasive showing of bad faith by the 
plaintiffs.267 The same powerlessness applies no matter if a 
post-signing market check or a go-shop provision is utilized to 
determine whether the board has selected the best deal for the 
target’s stockholders.268 Instead, the Delaware courts tend to 
  
 265 See In re Fort Howard Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 9991, 1988 WL 
83147, at *10-11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) (summarizing plaintiffs’ arguments that the 
special committee favored the management-affiliated transactions). 
 266 See supra Part III.B. 
 267 See, e.g., In re Fort Howard, 1988 WL 83147, at *12-13 (finding the good 
faith of the special committee to be suspect, but that the committee’s actions were not 
enough to indicate bad faith); see also supra note 108 and accompanying text 
(describing Chancellor Allen’s suspicion in Fort Howard of the CEO’s and special 
committee’s activities and Allen’s finding that the showing of bad faith was not 
sufficient).  
 268 Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, what really may be needed 
in order to curb the possibility of a board or management’s own selfish greed is, in the 
words of former U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Donaldson, 
a change in mindset—one that fosters not only a “culture of compliance” but 
also a company-wide environment that fosters ethical behavior and decision-
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use their decisions to comment on behavior that they find to be 
suspicious so that dealmakers will tend to shy away from such 
activity in future transactions.269 
As a result of this trend in Delaware jurisprudence, over 
the past two decades we have moved from an initial focus on 
fully shopped deals that include fiduciary outs simply to ensure 
that the directors do not violate their post-signing fiduciary 
duties, to a more exclusive reliance on the fiduciary out model 
to sell the company. We then moved from the fiduciary out 
model to go-shop provisions that in effect allow an auction to be 
conducted post-signing. This movement appears to be in direct 
opposition to Revlon where the Delaware Supreme Court 
chastised the parties for ending a heated bidding contest and 
held that a fiduciary out must be included in the definitive 
agreement. Although Revlon seemed to be the start of a trend 
towards fostering a more competitive bidding process, the 
Delaware courts’ decisions allowing much, if not all, of the sale 
process to take place post-signing does not foster such a heated 
bidding process when deal protections in the merger agreement 
act to discourage bids. Realistically, what board of directors 
would not be inclined to rely on go-shop provisions in the 
  
making. Creating that culture means doing more than developing good 
policies and procedures . . . . It means instilling an ethical culture—a 
company-wide commitment to do the right thing, this time and every time—
so much so that it becomes the core of what I call the essential “DNA” of the 
company. 
William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Remarks to the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (May 12, 2004), transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/spch051204whd.htm.  
 269 See Rock, supra note 7, at 1095-96 (stating that the advisory opinion-like 
nature of Delaware opinions are helpful to dealmakers in planning transactions, but 
they are problematic because of their fact-specific nature); Qualters, supra note 260,  
at 1 (quoting Vice Chancellor Strine as stating, “People learn from the cases, that’s 
what’s good about them . . . . It’s a low-cost opportunity.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Professor Rock has theorized: 
This reactive stance, combined with what I claim to be a fairly self-conscious 
attempt by the courts to shape the standards of conduct in a rapidly 
developing transactional form, may be the driving force behind judicial 
attempts to surpass it. Thus, the “preachiness” of Delaware MBO opinions, 
the pattern of criticizing conduct even when no injunction is issued, and 
judges’ extrajudicial utterances can all be read as attempts to be heard on a 
critical matter in the absence of a case raising just the right issue and in the 
absence of the articulation (or articulability) of a governing rule. Such 
utterances are, in a literal sense, advisory opinions. 
Rock, supra note 7, at 1095. 
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absence of a public auction or targeted market canvass?270 The 
long-term implications of the go-shop provision could very well 
be that the pre-signing public auction or more limited market 
canvass may go by the wayside as the Delaware courts have 
allowed such processes to be conducted post-signing.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In many ways we have come full circle since the merger 
wave of the 1980s and the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
landmark opinion in Revlon. The 1986 ruling in Revlon 
appeared to begin a movement toward a “pure” auction process 
that would result in achieving the best possible price for 
stockholders. The Delaware courts have recognized that a 
public auction or, at least, a targeted market canvass that 
occurs pre-signing, are the best ways to achieve value 
maximization. These methods allow potential buyers to bid on 
a target company before deal protection devices and other 
concerns work to inhibit bidding. However, less than two years 
after Revlon, the Delaware Court of Chancery authorized the 
almost exclusive reliance on no shop provisions coupled with 
fiduciary outs, or, in other words, a post-signing market check, 
to achieve value maximization. The Delaware courts have 
continued to validate these post-signing market checks while 
focusing on the sale process as a whole.  
Over the past three years, the passive post-signing 
market check has given way to go-shop provisions allowing 
target companies to actively shop themselves post-signing, 
when they would have otherwise been prevented from doing so. 
In effect, these provisions permit targets to extend their “store 
hours” and have moved the auction process post-signing. 
Critics have attacked these provisions as ineffective at 
maximizing stockholder value for various reasons, including 
that the provisions do not induce bids because of pre-existing 
deal protection devices and because the provisions allow target 
companies to favor the initial bidders, who are often private 
equity firms that are seeking to retain management or are 
providing management with certain compensation packages or 
  
 270 An exception likely exists for small micro-cap companies, who after the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s ruling in Netsmart, need to engage in a more complete 
targeted market canvass rather than rely on a post-signing market check as a sale 
method. For a discussion of sale methods with respect to micro-cap companies, see 
supra notes 83-85 accompanying text. 
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other incentives following closing. This Article contends, 
however, that the end result of the go-shop is really no 
different from the more passive post-signing market check that 
permits a company to terminate the agreement in favor of a 
superior proposal but does not allow the target to actively shop 
the company. The same criticisms can apply equally to both 
sale methods and active bidding can be inhibited due to deal 
protection devices when either sale method is utilized. The 
implications of this movement in Delaware jurisprudence 
toward reliance on post-signing market checks and go-shops 
results in the failure to use methods that encourage an active 
bidding process and the maximization of stockholder value. 
Because the Delaware courts do not focus on these sale 
processes but rather only check that the methods used are not 
so onerous that they would result in locking up a transaction, 
the courts have shifted their attention away from the policies 
promoted by Revlon. The exclusive reliance on go-shop 
provisions to sell a company and achieve the highest price for 
stockholders signals the death of the movement toward a purer 
competitive bidding process that first began over twenty years 
ago in Revlon. 
